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OPINION PIECE
TAKING RESPONSIBILITY
Robert M. Ackerman*
Communitarians have suggested that a balance
must be struck between individual rights and the public
welfare, and that our self-seeking tendencies must some-
times be set aside in pursuit of the common good. Govern-
ment is often (although not always) the mechanism through
which common interests are advanced. An abdication of
government responsibility may result in disaster, as was the
case with respect to Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath.
At the other extreme, the accumulation of too much power
in government can also bring about catastrophic conse-
quences, as in the case of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear plant
disaster in the Soviet Union. A balance must be struck
between the extremes of government passivity and "all
government, all the time. " Traditionally, this tension has
been framed as one of libertarianism versus collectivism; in
current American political parlance, that of liberalism
versus conservatism. But communitarians are more likely
to view these issues in terms of an adjustment of interests,
to be determined in the political arena, than as a clash of
rights, to be adjudicated in the courtroom. This essay sug-
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania
State University; B.A., Colgate University; J.D., Harvard Law School.
The author wishes to thank Kathryn Mason and Joel Samuels for their
invaluable research assistance. The author also wishes to thank Amitai
Etzioni, Hans Joas, Bodo von Greiff, Wolfgang Muller, and Wibren
van der Burg for their comments and encouragement. Earlier versions
of this essay appeared on the Communitarian Network webpage avail-
able at
http://www.gwu.edu/-ccps/WinnerofCommunitarianEssayContest.htm
and in German translation sub nom Verantwortung iibernehman,
2/2007 Leviathan 143.
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gests a communitarian framework for analyzing the boun-
daries of government power and responsibility.
Part I of the essay focuses on the Katrina disaster
and the abdication of government responsibility on the
local, state, and national levels both before and after the
hurricane.
Part II suggests the Chernobyl experience as a
counterpoint, cautioning us regarding the dangers of too
much government control.
Part III explores the underlying attitudes toward
government in the United States, suggesting that hostility
toward government has resulted in a "tragedy of the com-
mons" that undermines the public welfare.
Part IV outlines a series of communitarian guide-
lines for principled consideration of the proper role of
government.
12
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol4/iss1/1
4:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 13
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DELUGE AND DELUSION ..................................... 14
A. Do you know what it mean to miss New Or-
leans? .................................................... 14
B. "It ain t my fault" ................................ 22
C. Photo-op politics ................................... 29
II. COUNTERPOINT: THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER ........ 34
A. A nuclear whirlwind ............................... 34
B. Averting collapse .................................. 39
III. IN SEARCH OF A COHERENT GOVERNMENT ROLE...44
A. A nation of tax protestors ...................... 44
B. Rights and responsibilities .................... 49
C. The tragedy of the commons ................. 51
D. "Painless" solutions ............................. 55
IV. RECURRENT COMMUNITARIAN THEMES ................. 56
A. How much government? ........................ 56
B. How much law? ...................................... 58
C. The role of civil society ......................... 60
D. What level of government should inter-
vene? .................................................... 62
E. Individual responsibility ........................ 63
F. Responsible intervention ....................... 64
G. Regard for long-term consequences .......... 66
H. Being a good neighbor .......................... 70
13
et al.: Vol 4 No 1
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
4:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 14
. DELUGE AND DELUSION.
A. Do you know what it means to miss New Orleans?1
On Monday, August 29, 2005, at 6:10 a.m. Central
Daylight Time, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of
the United States, with the center of the storm making land-
fall a few miles east of New Orleans, Louisiana. Katrina
had been a Category 5 hurricane while in the Gulf.2 Its
intensity had diminished to Category 4 and then to a strong
Category 3 hurricane (with maximum sustained winds of
175 miles per hour) by the time it reached Louisiana and
Mississippi. 3 But Katrina's wind speed (the basis of its
numerical classification) told only part of the story. By any
measure, Hurricane Katrina was an exceptionally large
storm. Hurricane-force winds extended about 100 statute
miles away from her center, and tropical storm-force winds
4
extended about 230 miles away.
The residents of the Gulf States had been warned
for several days about Katrina's imminent landfall, but it
was not until 10:00 a.m. on Sunday, August 28, that New
Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin saw fit to order the first-ever
mandatory evacuation of the city. As a consequence, when
the hurricane struck, "[a]pproximately one-fifth of New
Orleans's 460,000 residents were still in the city, and a
similar proportion were left in each of the surrounding
parishes (approximately 900,000 people lived in these sub-
urbs)."5 Katrina's winds caused some destruction (includ-
ing tearing a hole in the roof of the Louisiana Superdome,
1 LOUIS ARMSTRONG, Do You KNOW WHAT IT MEANS TO MIss NEW
ORLEANS? (Bluebird RCA 1946).
2 RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT'L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL RE-
PORT: HURRICANE KATRINA 1 (Aug. 2005).3 id.
4 Id. at 1-4, 23-30.
5 DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA,
NEW ORLEANS, AND THE MississiPPi GULF COAST 89-90 (2006).
14
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where thousands of residents had taken shelter), but the
greatest devastation in New Orleans and elsewhere was a
consequence of the storm surge caused by the hurricane.
The Gulf of Mexico, Lake Pontchartrain, and a system of
rivers and connecting canals overflowed their banks and
breached the levees protecting New Orleans (much of
which lies below sea-level) and the surrounding communi-
ties from their waters. Low-lying neighborhoods in New
Orleans, the surrounding communities, and coastal areas in
Mississippi and Alabama were inundated and remained
underwater for several days. Thousands of citizens were
left stranded, or worse, drowned in the floodwaters. Their
desperation was exacerbated by what appeared to be an
utter breakdown of emergency rescue operations. State,
local, and national officials lacked organization, supplies
failed to reach their destinations, and public transportation
out of the city failed to materialize until several days after
the storm. New Orleans' predicament took on racial over-
tones, as a disproportionately large number of its stranded
residents were African-American. The loss of life, damage
to property, and overall devastation of New Orleans and
other parts of the Central Gulf Coast amounted to the worst
natural catastrophe in the history of the United States. The
tragedy painted a disturbing picture of disparity between
rich and poor, white and black, and a governing apparatus
that was too paralyzed to provide effective relief to belea-
guered citizens.
The floodwaters had not receded before the finger-
pointing began. Katrina was a natural disaster, but there
was a pervasive sense that the tragedy was unnecessarily
compounded by human failure. Hurricane Katrina would
raise anew questions about the role of government and
civic responsibility in America, issues of ongoing interest
to communitarians. The events surrounding Katrina sug-
gested serious lapses in areas of official responsibility at
several junctures, both before and after the storm. A few
prominent examples are as follows:
15
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* Years of dredging by the United States Army Corps
of Engineers had kept the Mississippi River open
for shipping. It had also removed millions of tons
of silt necessary to replenish the wetlands of the
Mississippi River Delta. Petroleum exploration had
caused more subsidence, further compromising the
wetlands. As a consequence, Louisiana lost 1900
square miles of wetlands between 1930 and 2004.6
The wetlands had acted as a natural sponge, absorb-
ing storm surges and protecting New Orleans and
other populated areas. With this natural sponge se-
verely eroded, almost nothing could absorb Katri-
na's storm surge before it struck the populated areas
of the Gulf Coast. Additionally, subsidence re-
duced the heights of the levees by as much as three
feet below their original design.7
" Further damage to the wetlands was caused by the
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR. GO), a canal
completed by the Corps of Engineers in the 1960s. 8
MR. GO also acted as a funnel for water being
forced up toward the city, leading to the breaches
that would cause massive flooding in New Orleans'
Lower Ninth Ward.9
" Levees constructed by the Corps of Engineers to
protect New Orleans from flooding were reinforced
by sheet piles consisting of interlocking steel sup-
6 Joel K. Boume, Jr., Gone with the Water, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct.
2004, at 88.
7 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF
THE NEW ORLEANS AND SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA HURRICANE
PROTECTION SYSTEM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1-4 (June 1,2006).
8 Joel K. Bourne, Jr., New Orleans: A Perilous Future, NAT'L GEO-
GRAPHIC, Aug. 2007, available at
http://ngn-nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0708/feature1/index.ht ml.
9Id.
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ports.10 An investigation subsequent to Katrina has
shown that the sheet piles "were too shallow to pre-
vent [a] flow" of water underneath them.1 "Tests.
. found that sheet piles reached only 10 feet below
sea level in some spots, far less than would protect
the city.' 12 The Corps' designs had called "for a
depth of 171 feet, but even that, the investigators
say, would have been too shallow."' 13 "[I]n spots
where the levees" were subsequently repaired, the
Corps of Engineers called "for sheet piles to be dri-
ven to depths of 51 to 65 feet."' 4 Soil material in-
corporated into the levees was also found
inadequate for the circumstances. 15  The levees
therefore lacked adequate foundation support.
While Katrina's storm surge would have crested the
levees in any event, the waters would have likely
receded without serious flooding had the levees re-
mained intact. Lacking adequate support, however,
the levees gave way, causing several New Orleans
neighborhoods (in particular, the predominately
African-American Lower Ninth Ward) to be inun-
dated with water. Not long before the storm, a re-
quest for $105 million to improve the levee system
had been reduced by the administration of President
George W. Bush to $40 million, despite re eated
warnings regarding the region's vulnerability.
'0 John Schwartz & Christopher Drew, Louisiana's Levee Inquiry
Faults Army Corps, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at A28.ll Id.
12 Id
13 1d.
1 4
1d.
15 INDEPENDENT LEVEE INVESTIGATION TEAM, UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA
AT BERKELEY, NEW ORLEANS SYSTEMS HURRICANE KATRINA XVIII
APP. AT 1-7 (2006).16 Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., United States of Shame, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
3, 2005, at A21.
17
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" The levees were subject to a confusing and ineffi-
cient administrative structure. A tangled web of lo-
cal authorities, often preoccupied with unrelated
projects, shared authority over the levees with the
Corps of Engineers. Responsibility was fragmented
and unclear. With so many in charge, nobody was
really in charge. The various structures built to con-
tain hurricanes did not function as a system and
lacked redundancy. Compromises in one part of the
"system" produced by political forces or environ-
mental concerns were not compensated for else-
where, where other agencies might be in control.
* Global warming may have played a role in Katri-
na's having become such a powerful storm. "[S]ea
surface temperature records show that the oceans
[and other large bodies of water (like the Gulf of
Mexico)] are more than 1 degree F[ahrenheit] war-
mer on average today to a century ago." 17 "Because
hurricanes draw strength from heat in ocean surface
waters," warmer water potentially "generate[s]
more powerful hurricanes."1 8  Water temperatures
fluctuate in any event, "[b]ut the higher the average
[temperature,] the more likely the water will be
warm enough to produce a strong storm on any giv-
en day during the hurricane season." 19 So while we
cannot say with any assurance that global warming
caused Katrina, the probability of severe hurricanes
like Katrina was significantly enhanced by global
warming. This idea may help explain why, for the
first time, the Tropical Prediction Center (the agen-
17 Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Katrina and Global Warm-
ing: Was Katrina's Power a Product of Global Warming?, available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/specialreports/katrina.cfm (last visited Aug.
23, 2007).
18id.
19Id.
18
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cy that assigns names to hurricanes) ran all the way
through the alphabet in 2005.20
While public authorities had ample warning of Hur-
ricane Katrina, they failed to mobilize a transport
system equal to the need for evacuation. Many of
the poor residents of the region (and in particular
the poor African-American residents of the region)
lacked automobiles of their own. These people
were dependent upon public transportation to leave
the city.21 Little, if any such transportation materia-
lized. Two days before the hurricane, Amtrak
routes that normally serve New Orleans were termi-
nated in Memphis and Atlanta.22 (French tourists
stranded in New Orleans before the storm went in-
stinctively to the railroad station and were bewil-
20 Hurricane names are agreed upon at international meetings of the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and once a storm system
with counterclockwise circulation reaches wind speeds of thirty-nine
miles per hour or greater, the Tropical Prediction Center (TPC) in
Miami, Florida, assigns the system one of the pre-determined names.
National Hurricane Center, Naming Hurricanes, available at
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/basics/naming.shtml (last
visited June 26, 2007). The most active hurricane season, prior to
2005, was in 1933 when the season produced twenty-one named tropi-
cal cyclones; in 2005, the season produced twenty-eight named sys-
tems, running the TPC completely through the WMO's alphabetized
list of names and making 2005 the most active season to date. ERIC S.
BLAKE, ET AL., THE DEADLIEST, COSTLIEST, AND MOST INTENSE UNIT-
ED STATES TROPICAL CYCLONES FROM 1851 TO 2006 14 (Apr. 2007),
available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/DeadliestCostliest.shtm.
21 Jason DeParle, What Happens to a Race Deferred, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
4, 2005, § 4 at 1 (reporting that even among the poor in New Orleans,
African-Americans were less likely than whites to own automobiles)
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/04/weekinreview/04depa.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2008).
22 Amtrak, Service Alert: Hurricane Katrina Update, available at
http://www. amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=Amtrak/am2
Copy/SimpleCopy_.Popup&c=am2Copy&cid=1093554014709 (last
visited Jan. 10, 2008).
19
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dered to find it closed.23) Hundreds of the city's
school buses remained in their parking lots; these
buses became disabled when the lots were
24flooded. The City ordered an evacuation, but
made no provision to assist residents in evacuation
efforts. Indeed, buses out of the city did not mate-
rialize for several days after the hurricane struck.25
With 30% of National Guard units tied up in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and the White House claiming ig-
norance of severe flooding until several days after
the storm, the federal government was slow to mo-
26bilize for an evacuation.
Government on all levels (i.e., the city, the state,
and the federal government) was particularly impo-
tent when it came to providing aid to people in the
beleaguered area after the hurricane hit. Those
stranded in New Orleans were told to report to the
Louisiana Superdome, where they would find pro-
visions. As many as 50,000 people heeded that call,
only to find a facility that was ill-prepared to ac-
commodate them.27 The hurricane caused a power
outage, and with it, the absence of air-conditioning,
leaving people to bake in the Louisiana heat while
trapped inside the indoor stadium. 28 Basic sanita-
tion soon broke down in the huge facility. Reports
23 Dan Baum, New Orleans Postcard: Consulat DInfluence, THE NEW
YORKER, Mar. 6, 2006, at 30. This episode illustrates a major differ-
ence between American and European expectations regarding public
transportation.
24 BRINKLEY, supra note 5, at 359.25 /d. at 386.
26 Julian Borger & Duncan Campbell, Why Did Help Take So Long to
Arrive?, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 3, 2005, at 4.
27 See Robert Tanner, Thousands Evacuated from New Orleans Satur-
day, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 3, 2005, available at
http://www.wwlt v.com/sharedcontent/nationworld/katrina/stories/0903
05ccKatrinawcMainstory. I f76bb86.html.
28 BRiNKLEY, supra note 5, at 191-93.
20
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of assaults, rapes, and even murders were rampant;
while most of these reports were later discredited, a
sense of anarchy was prevalent.29 Several thousand
additional victims sought refuge in New Orleans'
Ernest N. Morial Convention Center, from which
reports of anarchy surpassed those coming from the
Superdome. (At least one confirmed murder did
occur at the Convention Center .30) Anarchy was al-
so evident in the streets of New Orleans, where
many business establishments fell victim to loo-
ters. 3 1  Some of these "looters" could hardly be
blamed, as they were procuring food, water, and
other supplies necessary to sustain the stranded
32population.
" Other aspects of the rescue, such as relief for vic-
tims stranded in the floodwaters, were similarly dis-
organized. Approximately one-third of the mem-
bers of the New Orleans Police Department de-
serted their posts. 33 National Guard units were slow
in coming; the efforts of these and other law en-
forcement officials who arrived from as far away as
Oregon and Puerto Rico were uncoordinated, lack-
ing any central command.34 Some of the law en-
forcement units seemed more intent on quelling
non-existent rioting than on providing relief to flood
victims.
35
* In at least one instance, citizens of New Orleans
found themselves to be victims of bad neighbors.
29 Id. at 193, 240, 476.
30 Brian Thevenot & Gordon Russell, Reports of Anarchy at Superdome
Overstated, SEATTLE TIMEs, Sept. 26, 2005, at Al.
31 BRINKLEY, supra note 5, at 200-05, 276.32 Id. passim; Tanner, supra note 27.
33 Dan Baum, Deluged: When Katrina Hit, Where Were the Police?,
THENEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2006, at 50, 60.34 Id.
35 id.
21
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Attempting to leave the stricken city and looking for
high ground, several hundred New Orleans resi-
dents tried crossing the Mississippi to Gretna, Loui-
siana, where they were met by a sheriff's
department intent on turning them back.36 Escape
from the devastated city, even for those willing and
able to walk, was thereby blocked.
B. "It ain't my fault. ,37
The devastation of Hurricane Katrina and its after-
math suggest a natural disaster the consequences of which
were severely exacerbated by an abdication of governmen-
tal responsibility on all levels. That the human failure was
primarily one of government is hard to deny. While indi-
viduals had, to be sure, taken it upon themselves to live in
New Orleans and elsewhere on the Gulf Coast, they did so
in reliance on a system of levees, canals, navigation, and
transportation engineered, built, and maintained primarily
by government. Indeed, only government could have con-
structed and maintained a system of such scale. Yet the
American government, which had, only a few months earli-
er, raced halfway around the world to provide aid for vic-
tims of a giant tsunami, was now found seriously wanting
when faced with a natural disaster at home.
The immediate target of public wrath was Michael
D. Brown, Director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and a man clearly in over his head. In the days
following Katrina's onslaught, Brown was depicted as
studiously ignorant about the conditions in New Orleans,
more concerned about his attire and dinner schedule than
36 Chip Johnson, Police Made Their Storm Misery Worse, S.F. CHRON,
Sept. 9, 2005, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file-/c/a2005/09/09/BAGL1EL1 KH1.DTL.
37 SMOKEY JOHNSON, IT AIN'T MY FAULT (Night Train International
2000).
22
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the coordination of relief for the stricken region. Neverthe-
less, President Bush, in cheerleader mode, proclaimed,
"Brownie, you're doing a heck of a job[!]" as New Orleans
sank into the mire. 38 Shortly thereafter, Brown would find
himself in the position of scapegoat for the muffed opera-
tion, becoming comic fodder for late-night television hosts
in a Warholian moment of infamy. He would resign later
in September, only to establish a business as a disaster
preparedness consultant.
39
But to blame a single individual for the disaster was
to miss the point. Brown was representative of two much
larger phenomena: a diffusion of responsibility among a
patchwork quilt of federal, state, and local authorities; and
an administration in Washington that appeared to be less
than fully committed to some of the most essential func-
tions of government. 40 Evidence of the latter problem had
previously surfaced in connection with the war in Iraq.
While many would come to dispute the need to invade Iraq
in 2003 and to deplore the manipulation of intelligence
used to justify the invasion, few would argue that national
defense is not an essential function of government. Yet
even as it schemed to carry on a war against Iraq, the ad-
ministration failed to adequately equip the military to pro-
ceed with its mission. Military experts lamented the
inadequate number of troops deployed for the mission; the
understaffing violated a core principle of the "Powell Doc-
trine," which espoused the use of force that is "overwhelm-
38 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President
Arrives in Alabama, Briefed on Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 2, 2005),
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/O9/2OO50902_2.htm-.
39 Mark Leibovich, A Punch Line Who Refuses to Fade Away, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2006, at Al1.
40 Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Killed By Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2005, at A21.
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ing and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy., 41
Despite months of planning, soldiers lacked body armor
and other essential equipment.42 Events suggested the
absence of any plan to secure either Iraq's munitions or its
national treasures from looting as the conquest of that
country was completed. The looting in turn helped supply
a protracted insurgency about which the administration had
been warned, but which did not figure into its plans. 43
Even the administration's highest priorities seemed
thwarted by either a lack of foresight or a fundamental
unwillingness to commit public resources to essential func-
tions.
The "less government the better" philosophy of the
Bush Administration-a recurring theme of Republican
Party rhetoric since 1980 44 -resulted in a lack of serious-
41 The Powell Doctrine was espoused by General Colin Powell, while
serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1991. Other ele-
ments of the Powell Doctrine: that military action should be used only
as a last resort and only where there was a clear risk to national security
by the intended target; that there must be strong support for the cam-
paign by the general public; and that there must be a clear exit strategy
from the conflict. See Colin Powell, U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,
71 FOREIGN AFF. 32 (1992).
42 When the Secretary of Defense was called to account for this, his
response was "You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army
you might want or wish to have at a later time." Eric Schmitt, Troops'
Queries Leave Rumsfeld on the Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at
Al (quoting Secretary Rumsfeld).
43 Prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq predicted
insurgency in the wake of the conquest of Iraq. STAFF OF S. SELECT
COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 110TH CONG., REPORT ON PREWAR
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ABOUT POSTWAR IRAQ (Comm. Print
2007), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/prewar.pdf.
44 The Republican administration of President Ronald Reagan, elected
in 1980, reduced non-military governmental expenditures, but contin-
ued the military buildup begun by its predecessor. This buildup is
widely credited with ending the Cold War with a Soviet government
that was unable to compete. Jeffrey W. Knopf, Did Reagan Win the
Cold War?, STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, Aug. 2004, available at
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ness about the responsibilities of government and the staff-
ing of the administration by those, like Mr. Brown, for
whom a government post was a reward for party loyalty
rather than competence, a path to power but not public
service.45  In the conservative catechism, "good govern-
ment" was an oxymoron, so government might as well
serve as an object of plunder, rather than as a form of pub-
lic service.
None of this, however, was likely to surprise propo-
nents of social choice theory. As Professor Frank Michel-
man has explained, social choice theorists explain public
policy choices as manifestations of "no public or general or
social interest,... only concatenations of particular inter-
ests or private preferences., 46  If government was to be
viewed not as an instrument to serve the people, but rather
as an opportunity to advance one's personal interests, it was
easy to see how an agency like FEMA could be trans-
formed into a fiefdom bereft of a long-term plan for disas-
ter response, or for it to engage in what New York Times
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.nilsi/2004/aug/knopfAUG04.pdf. For a
discussion of Soviet failures, see infra text accompanying notes 76-83.
4' The practice was repeated in other sectors of government. Most
notably, staffing at the Justice Department, which traditionally had
been the bailiwick of career professionals, took on a partisan edge
during the administration of George W. Bush. See CQ Transcripts
Wire, Goodling Testifies Before the House Judiciary Committee, THE
WASH. POST, May 23, 2007, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.comwp-
srv/politics/transcripts/goodlingtestimony_052307.html; Margaret
Talev & Marisa Taylor, U.S. Attorneys Saga Exposes Weakened Justice
Department Independence, THE NEWS-SENTINEL, June 18, 2007,
available at
http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/newssentinel/news/editorial/ 7386647.
htm. Federal legislation prohibits appointment of certain federal em-
ployees on the basis of political affiliation. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(l)(E)
(2007).
46 Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-
Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government
Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148 (1977).
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columnist Maureen Dowd called "a chilling lack of empa-
thy combined with a stunning lack of efficiency." 47 Indeed,
the entire Homeland Security apparatus of which FEMA
was a part, conceived as a necessary device to avert future
September 1 1-type disasters, had become, in short order, a
repository for congressional pork barrels, with rural police
and fire departments in favored districts awash in funds
while their urban counterparts (the more likely targets of
future terrorist attacks) struggled to make-do. 48  Mean-
while, the federal government, rather than shrinking in size
(a modest accomplishment of the Clinton Administration)
actually grew, as domestic expenditures, 49 and along with
them, the budget deficit, soared during the first five years
of the George W. Bush presidency. 5 1 As more than one
47 Maureen Dowd, supra note 16, at A2 1.
48 Dean E. Murphy, Security Grants Still Streaming to Rural States,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 2004, at Al. In Katrina's wake, Republican-
governed Mississippi received a disproportionately larger amount of
federal relief than Democratically-governed Louisiana. See Larry
Copeland, In Mississippi, Katrina Recovery Gaining Steam, USA
TODAY, July 24, 2006, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-07-24-miss-
rebuilds-x.htm; Adam Nossiter, Senators at Louisiana Hearing Critic-
ize Federal Recovery Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at A16.49 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL BUDGET DATA, 8 TABLE 7
(2006) available at http://www.cbo.gov/budget/data/historical.pdf (last
visited Feb. 3, 2008).
50 See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Budget of the United States Gov-
ernment, Fiscal Year 2007: Summary of Tables 315, Table S-3 (2006)
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/budget/tables.pdf
!last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
1 Belatedly, some Republicans came to lament the Bush Administra-
tion's enlargement of government and Congressional use of budgetary
earmarks. In explaining how the conservative movement has been
undermined, conservative activist Richard Viguerie states,
[Wihen you add everything up, what you have is a
massive overreach of executive powers, and massive
overspending by people who claim they're conservatives.
Every President, with hardly any exceptions, will take as
26
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wag has noted, "For years, Republicans had told us that
government was bad; when they came to power, they
proved it." As a consequence Americans, who had raced
halfway around the world to aid victims of an Asian tsuna-
mi eight months prior to Katrina, seemed incapable of tak-
ing care of their own when disaster struck the Gulf Coast.
At a Congressional hearing following the Katrina
disaster, FEMA Director Brown alleged that Louisiana
Governor Kathleen Blanco and New Orleans Mayor Ray
Nagin (both Democrats) bore most, if not all the blame, for
the failures in the response to Katrina, and that Brown's
own only mistake had been not to realize sooner the
inability of Blanco and Nagin to perform their duties. 52 In
subsequent testimony, Brown blamed the Department of
Homeland Security and his White House patrons-but not
himself-for the federal government's lack of preparation
and its delay in providing relief and rescue. 53  A
Congressional committee, composed entirely of
Republicans, would focus its blame on Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff.54  According to the panel's
chairman, Mr. Chertoff had "primary responsibility for
much power as he gets. That's what Presidents do. Bush
has tried more than most. And it was supposed to be the
Republicans in Congress who would do oversight of the
President, so that he wouldn't get away with too much
abuse of power. But they abdicated that role. It was all
about the maintenance of power, and now look where
they are.
Jeffrey Goldberg, Party Unfaithful: The Republican Implosion, THE
NEW YORKER, June 4, 2007, at 40, 45.52 Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency: H. Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation
for & Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2005)
(testimony of Michael D. Brown, former FEMA Director).53 Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership: S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (Feb.
10, 2006) (testimony of Michael D. Brown, former FEMA Director).
54 See Spencer S. Hsu, Katrina Report Spreads Blame: Homeland
Security, Chertoff Singled Out, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2006, at Al.
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managing the national response to a catastrophic disas-
ter,"55 yet, as the committee reported, he had handled his
decision-making responsibilities "late, ineffectively, or not
at all. A Bush Administration report focused on a need
for administrative reorganization that would divide various
functions among several government agencies, some in
different departments-this only a few short years after a
major government reorganization through which the De-
partment of Homeland Security was created.57 A Senate
report subsequent to Katrina recommended abolishing
FEMA and creating another Homeland Security unit, a
"National Preparedness and Response Authority." 58 Ap-
parently, performance would be improved by rearranging
the deck chairs on the Titanic.
Government lapses in connection with Hurricane
Katrina were by no means the exclusive domain of the
Republican Party. Under both major parties, the Corps of
Engineers had developed a reputation for heavy-
handedness, enjoying hegemony over flood control and
paying little heed to the environmental consequences of its
actions, while feeding off pork-barrel appropriations from
Democratic, as well as Republican, Congresses. 59 Katrina
55 Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Department of Homeland Securi-
ty: Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. (Oct. 19, 2005) (opening
statement of Tom Davis, chairman).56 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT ON THE SELECT BIPARTI-
SAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, H. REP. No. 109-377, at 2-3 passim
(2nd Sess. 2006); see Hsu, supra note 54 at Al.
7 George W. Bush Administration, The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina: Lessons Learned, 65-82 (2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-leamed.pdf.
58 S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S. REP. No. 109-
322, RECOMMENDATIONS 607 (2006).59 TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE & NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, CROS-
SROADS: CONGRESS, THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS, AND WASTEFUL WA-
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found Democrats in state and city governments in Louisi-
ana and New Orleans dropping the ball in planning, execu-
tion, and emergency response. Nevertheless, the inept Ray
Nagin would be re-elected as New Orleans' mayor in May
2006, demonstrating the tendency of the electorate to close
ranks around homegrown incompetence.
C. Photo-op politics.
American politicians tend to deal with squeaky-
wheel, crisis-of-the-moment issues that are conducive to
"photo opportunities" and other media coverage, but not to
engage in long-term planning or quiet reflection. Much
like corporate officers whose visions runs only to the end of
the current quarter, politicians tend to address the hot-
button issue of the day, with their responses tailored to
exploit whatever momentary political advantage can be
obtained, rather than taking a long view of the public inter-
est. Be it the devastation of Katrina, a coal mine disaster
that takes a dozen lives, 60 or even a professional quarter-
TER PROJECTS 2-3 (2000), available at
http://www.nwf.org/wildlife/pdfs/Crossroads.pdf (last visited Feb. 3,
2008).
60 Representative of this behavior was the response to the Sago Mine
disaster in January 2006, which took the lives of twelve miners. Ian
Urbina & Andrew W. Lehren, U.S. Is Reducing Safety Penalties for
Mine Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at Al "[T]he operator [of the
Sago Mine] had been cited 273 times since 2004. None of the fines,
[however,] exceeded $460." Id. The New York Times reported that this
was typical of the pattem of reduced mine safety enforcement by the
Bush Administration, which, even after imposing fines far smaller than
the maximum allowable, was lax in their collection. Id. The Congres-
sional response was to introduce legislation to increase the maximum
fines allowable, not to demand better enforcement of existing law. Id.
Lest one surmise that the Bush Administration's tendency to compro-
mise with mine operators reflected the needs of a struggling industry,
one should note that the International Coal Group, which operates the
Sago Mine, reported $110 million in net profits during 2005. Id.
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back's involvement in a dog fighting ring,6' the typical
legislative response is a predictable one: press conferences,
legislative hearings, grandstanding, and still more legisla-
tion, rather than effective oversight regarding implementa-
tion of legislation already in effect. The Bush
Administration may have been derelict in attending to dis-
aster relief after Katrina, but it retained enough media
savvy to stage a dramatically-lit and heavily scripted Presi-
dential television address from Jackson Square in New
Orleans a few days after the storm.
That publicity-mongering and point-scoring is a bi-
partisan affair that can be demonstrated by the grandstand-
ing that attended the arrival of $3 per gallon gasoline prices
in the spring of 2006. Democrats were eager to blame the
cost of gas (still substantially less than what Europeans
were accustomed to paying) on price-gouging by the oil
companies and the short-sightedness of the Bush Adninis-
tration and to urge adoption of deficit enhancement meas-
ures such as "a sixty-day halt on collecting federal gasoline
taxes." 62 The Bush Administration, in a conspiracy with
Big Oil, was depriving Americans of their God-given right
to drive, and there were political points to be scored.
Meanwhile, Republican leaders proposed a $100-per-driver
tax rebate,63 presumably to be financed by more federal
61 A more recent example of Congressional grandstanding was Senator
John Kerry's pledge to introduce tougher federal legislation to ban dog
fighting. Senator Kerry's pledge came in the wake of revelations of a
dog-fighting ring that included Atlanta Falcons quarterback Michael
Vick, who eventually pled guilty to federal charges. See Senator John
Kerry's Online Office, Kerry Asks NFL Commissioner to Immediately
Suspend Vick Over "Sickening" Dogfighting Case, July 20, 2007,
http://kerry.senate.gov/cfm/record.cfm?id=279464.
62 Edmund L. Andrews & Michael Janofsky, Second Thoughts in
Congress on Oil Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at Al.
63 Press Release, United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natu-
ral Resources, Domenici Introduces the Gas Price and Rebate Act of
2006 (Apr. 27, 2006) available at
http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.
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borrowing from East Asian banks. 64 "'Political anxiety in
an election year is to blame for a lot of the bad bills Con-
gress passes,' said Representative Jeff Flake," an Arizona
Republican who opposed this short-lived proposal. 65 Lead-
ers of neither major party took pains to point out the need
to develop a real national energy policy, to promote con-
servation (and with it, public transportation), and to invest
in alternative sources of energy-in other words, anything
requiring planning or sacrifice on the part of the American
people.
66
This infantile attitude toward governance seeks re-
fuge in "painless" solutions, in which constituents are
treated not as citizens, but consumers; not as responsible
participants in a common enterprise, but as supplicants
hoping to feed from a public trough. Rather than demand
of the American public, as President Kennedy did, that we
"ask not what [our] country can do for [us], but what [we]
can do for [our] country,",67 present-day politicians ask
Americans to consider whether we are "better off now than
Detail&PressReleaseid=234941 &Month=4&Year=2006&Party= 1
2ast visited Feb. 4, 2008).
See U.S. Treasury Department, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury
Securities (May. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt. (charting major foreign holders of
treasury securities from November 2006 to November 2007).
65 Carl Hulse et al., Republicans Drop a Tax Plan After Business Lead-
ers Protest, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at Al.
66 Lamenting the "utterly shameless, utterly over-the-top Republican
pandering and Democratic point-scoring that have been masquerading
as governing in response to this energy crisis," New York Times col-
umnist Thomas Friedman called for the creation of a third political
party because neither major party is willing to tell Americans what they
need to hear: that a solution "requires sacrifice today for gain tomor-
row." Thomas L. Friedman, Let's (Third) Party, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2006, at A25.
67 President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961).
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we were four years ago." 68 War is waged in Iraq, for a
number of reasons, some justified, some contrived, but
instead of urging us to shared sacrifice, the administration
and Congress rewards us (or at least the most affluent
among us) with tax reductions. Pork barrel expenditures-
not for improved levees in New Orleans, but for bridges to
nowhere in Alaska-grow to budget-busting proportions
through an undemocratic "earmarking" process, all to be
financed not through user fees or taxes, but through the
blue smoke and mirrors of supply-side economics and fan-
ciful growth projections. In the days following Katrina's
onslaught, Thomas Friedman observed,
Besides ripping away the roofs of New Or-
leans, Katrina ripped away the argument that
we can cut taxes, properly educate our kids,
compete with India and China, succeed in Iraq,
keep improving the U.S. infrastructure, and
take care of a catastrophic emergency - without
putting ourselves totally into the debt of Bei-
jing.
So many of the things the Bush team
has ignored or distorted under the guise of
fighting Osama were exposed by Katrina: its
refusal to impose a gasoline tax after 9/11,
which would have begun to shift our economy
much sooner to more fuel-efficient cars, helped
raise money for a rainy day and eased our de-
pendence on the world's worst regimes for
energy; its refusal to develop some form of na-
tional health care to cover the 40 million unin-
sured; and its insistence on cutting more taxes,
even when that has contributed to incomplete
68 Soon to be President, Ronald Reagan, asked Americans to consider,
"whether you are better off today than four years ago." President
Ronald Reagan, Reagan-Carter Presidential Debate (Oct. 28, 1980).
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levees and too small an Army to deal with Ka-
trina, Osama and Saddam at the same time.
69
Critics of the war in Iraq have complained that it
has left the American military stretched too thin.70 But the
stretch is not beyond that which we are capable; it is simply
beyond that which we have been willing to commit.
71
Today's global military commitments are fulfilled not by
sons and daughters drafted from the citizenry-at-large, but
by an "all-volunteer" army, consisting primarily of low-
income people with few economic alternatives, gleaned
from America's urban ghettoes and rural communities.72 A
less populous, less affluent United States of America was
able to stretch its military around the globe during World
War II, but that was an enterprise to which the nation was
fully committed, for which the administration in power had
prepared the American people to sacrifice, and in which
most American families had a direct stake, often through
one or more of its members in military service. Americans
would have been similarly disposed to sacrifice after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. But instead of
imploring us to shared sacrifice, the President told Ameri-
cans to "live your lives and hug your children., 73 The tax
breaks and pork-barrel expenditures continued. A critic of
69 Thomas L. Friedman, Osama and Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2005, at A25.70 See generally LYNN E. DAVIS, ET AL., STRETCHED THIN: ARMY
FORCES FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS (2005) (prepared for the United
States Army).
71 This lack of commitment may find its roots in the omission of Powell
Doctrine principles from war planning. See generally Powell, supra
note 41.
72 The army's current recruiting slogan, An Army of One, hardly brings
to mind the more communitarian, brothers-in-arms philosophy of what
Tom Brokaw and others have called "the Greatest Generation."
73 George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001).
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the Bush Administration captured its post-September 11
attitude with the words, "We're at war. Let's party!" 74
Granted, it is difficult for a president to tell the
American people that it is time for us to eat our vegetables.
But we have gorged on a diet of sweets and fats for too
long. Indeed, the recent upswing in obesity among Ameri-
cans, young and old-and with it, the growth in related
maladies such as diabetes and heart disease-is an apt
metaphor for our debt-plagued government and society. 75
The time has come for all of us to take responsibility.
II. COUNTERPOINT: THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER.
A. A nuclear whirlwind.
In the context of responsible governing, Katrina
was, both literally and figuratively, a reaping of the whirl-
wind. Poor planning and neglect had come home to roost
in the flooded streets of New Orleans in a visible, demon-
74 Friedman, supra note 66 (referring to a statement by Joel Hyatt).
Conservative activist Richard Viguerie has pointed out that Bush has
followed in the "guns-and-butter" footsteps of President Lyndon B.
Johnson, abjuring the approach of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Harry S. Truman, and Ronald Reagan, who cut discretionary domestic
spending as they increased defense spending. RICHARD A. VIGUERIE,
CONSERVATIVES BETRAYED 25 (2006).
75 An article by Jackson Lears espouses this concept.
Americans are awash in red ink. Consumer indebtedness
is soaring, the savings rate is down to zero and people are
filing for bankruptcy at record rates. To many observers,
these are symptoms of cultural decline, from sturdy thrift
to flabby self-gratification--embodied in the current ob-
esity epidemic. The fattest nation on earth is also the
greediest consumer of global resources and now is bor-
rowing more than ever to satisfy its appetites.
Jackson Lears, The Way We Live Now: The American Way of Debt,
N.Y. TIMEs MAG., June 11,2006, at 13. The article goes on to
suggest that commentators have historically lamented Americans'
tendency toward indebtedness. Id. at 13-16.
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strable way. Were the solution to dysfunctional govern-
ment simply more government, or the consolidation of
power in a single, central government, the remedy could be
derived fairly easily, but solutions to complex problems are
seldom this facile. The past century has provided many
lessons regarding the danger of imposing an all-powerful
government as alpha and omega of all matters. Few were
as vivid as the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster, which
rocked the Soviet Union in April 1986. The explosion at
the nuclear facility near the Ukrainian city of Chernobyl
immediately killed thirty-one people, required the evacua-
tion of 135,000 others, and contaminated an area roughly
the size of England.76 The precise number of cancers and
other illnesses attributable to the disaster will never be
ascertained, but the numbers are probably in the thousands,
with genetic damage possibly being passed down through
several generations. A United Nations report issued in the
fall of 2005 suggested that 4,000 people would, in the end,
die from diseases caused by direct exposure to the radia-
tion.77 Greenpeace, an environmental group not immune
from the use of hyperbole, released its own response in
April 2006 (twenty years after the explosion), claiming that
in the final analysis Chernobyl would kill at least 90,000.78
Chernobyl was the product of a centrally planned
economy in which the government based in Moscow was
the first and last authority. Without private enterprise, a
free press, or internal checks and balances to constrain it,
there was nothing to prevent the Soviet state from engaging
7 6 NEA COMMITTEE ON RADIATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH, CHERNOBYL
TEN YEARS ON RADIOLOGICAL AND HEALTH IMPACT 18, 27-28 (1995),
available at http://www.nea.fr/html/rp/chemobyl/vrml/chemobyl.htnl.
77 Press Release, World Health Org., et al., Chernobyl: The True Scale
of the Accident (Sept. 5, 2005).
78 GREENPEACE, THE CHERNOBYL CATASTROPHE: CONSEQUENCES ON
HUMAN HEALTH 23 (I. Blokov et al. eds., 2006), available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/intemational/press/reports/cher
nobylhealthreport.pdf.
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in a reckless course of action. The state could do no
wrong; there was nobody to compete with it, nobody to
criticize it, no mechanism to check its excesses.79 Marx
and Engels had instructed us that in time, the state would
just wither away; in the meantime, it imposed a structure
that dominated human endeavor to a greater degree than
anything mankind had previously seen, with a death grip
that stifled initiative, ambition, and progress.
To be sure, Chernobyl was not the only disaster
caused by Soviet-style totalitarianism. The Soviet inva-
sions of Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), Sta-
lin's massacre of the kulaks, and the repression of the
Gulag were among hundreds of examples of the excesses of
the Soviet state. But Chernobyl demonstrated that Soviet-
style totalitarianism was not even technically competent.
Military parity with the West would, for a time, mask the
Soviet Empire's economic weakness, but the Chernobyl
disaster revealed that even the vaunted Soviet nuclear pro-
gram was a fagade covering a flawed and creaky infrastruc-
ture. The "workers' paradise" promised by Lenin and
Stalin spewed forth not only the devastation of Chernobyl
but also the environmental wasteland that covered much of
Eastern Europe and Russia by the time of the Soviet Em-
pire's demise circa 1990. If the Katrina disaster presents a
sorry case of abdication of government responsibility, the
Chemobyl catastrophe stands as a harsh illustration of what
can occur when a society and its economy are characterized
by "all government, all the time."
79 The regulatory process in the United States is not without its critics.
But the worst American nuclear plant mishap, Three Mile Island in
1979, paled in comparison to the Chemobyl disaster. Just one year
after the Three Mile Island incident, the author moved to a location just
twenty-five miles upwind of Three Mile Island, where he and his fami-
ly have enjoyed a healthy portion of their lives. For all its shortcom-
ings, a combination of private enterprise and government regulation
appears to have averted more serious nuclear disasters.
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In Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, contemporary
observers saw Chernobyl as a clear signal that the Soviet
Union was not the technological powerhouse it had been
assumed to be. The nuclear plant disaster humbled the
Kremlin and emboldened those who would challenge the
Soviet Empire, causing it to topple within a few short years.
Similarly, in the aftermath of Katrina, people in the United
States and abroad came to wonder whether the world's only
remaining global superpower had the will as well as the
wherewithal to confront serious domestic challenges.
Chernobyl exposed raw the shortcomings of a "people's
dictatorship" that was more bluff than substance; in Katri-
na's aftermath, Americans could not help but wonder
whether we had lost the ability to take care of our own.
The Soviet experience demonstrated the danger of too
much government; the American that of not enough. In
both cases, disaster revealed underlying flaws in governing
philosophy. In both Moscow and Washington, the same
truth was exposed: the emperor had no clothes.
We hesitate to paint with too broad a brush. There
are nuances that work against our grand theory. Critics of
the United States Army Corps of Engineers have long
complained about that agency's unfettered hegemony over
flood control. 80 The single-mindedness of the Corps' un-
dertakings, often oblivious to environmental consequences,
was more reminiscent of the blinders-on mentality of the
Soviet management philosophy than the chaotic misma-
nagement displayed by other American government agen-
cies in Katrina's immediate aftermath. And while the
governments of New Orleans, Louisiana, and the United
States may have failed Katrina's victims, they were gene-
rously assisted by governments in other states, most nota-
bly Texas, which housed thousands of homeless people and
opened the schoolhouse doors to their children. Americans
80 TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE & NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, Supra
note 59.
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also responded admirably to Katrina through non-
governmental efforts, raising disaster relief funds and vo-
lunteering in large numbers to aid the victims and rebuild
the Gulf Coast. 81  Indeed, the very existence of several
layers of responders, some public, some private, assured
that some relief would arrive for Katrina's beleaguered
victims. Two centuries ago, Alexis DeToqueville observed
that Americans had constructed a strong civil society to
compensate for the weakness of their government.82 That
structure has provided a measure of salvation in the wake
of Katrina and other demands to which our governments,
federal, state, and local, have been slow to respond.
While the Soviet government's initial reaction to
Chemobyl was the sort of tight-lipped non-disclosure cha-
racteristic of a totalitarian regime, Moscow's long-term
response was somewhat more enlightened and humane than
that which one might expect from an "evil empire." Within
a few days after the explosion, the Soviet government or-
dered and conducted mass evacuations and provided the
means for people to leave the contaminated area and to
sustain their lives thereafter. In so doing, it undertook a
81 Particularly noteworthy were the efforts of the Mormon Church,
which quickly sped supplies and relief workers to the beleaguered Gulf
Coast. The Mormon Church-in its ability to mobilize its members for
the common good-demonstrates some of the finest aspects of civil
society. See All About Mormons, Mormon Humanitarian Efforts,
available at
http://www.allaboutmormons.com/mormon-humanitarian-service.php
(last visited June 26, 2007). The church's critics would say that it also
displays communitarian's darker side, with evidence of strong out-
group antagonisms. That is far more likely to have been true in the past
than the present. See Douglas 0. Linder, The Mountain Meadows
Massacre of 1857 and the Trials of John D. Lee: An Account (2006),
available at
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mountainmeadows/lee
account.html.
82 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA passim (Ge-
rald Bevan trans., Penguin Books Ltd. 2003).
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role not regarded as extraordinary for a socialist state. In
the cases of both Katrina and Chernobyl, problems result-
ing, at least in part, from either an excess or lack of gov-
ernment involvement were ameliorated through more
communitarian solutions: in one case, the compassionate
ministries of civil society and private charity; in the other,
the distributive justice philosophy of a socialist state. In
the end, our salvation lies in neither over-dependency on
government nor the abandonment of government responsi-
bility, but rather somewhere in the middle. 83
B. Averting Collapse.
In his excellent book, Collapse, Jared Diamond de-
scribes the sad fate of several of the world's civilizations,
each of which ultimately failed to thrive because of an
unwise allocation of limited resources. 84 Diamond
attributes societal collapse to a number of factors, including
environmental damage, climate change, hostile neighbors,
decreased support by friendly neighbors, and society's
response to environmental problems. 85 He acknowledges
that much environmental degradation is natural or inadver-
tent, but that it is the variable of human response that can
spell the difference between a society that disintegrates and
one that continues to thrive. 86 Diamond documents how in
environments as diverse as Easter Island and Norse Green-
83 Indeed, by the mid-1980s the Soviet Empire was neither as monolith-
ic nor as autocratic as it had once seemed. Nikita Khrushchev's "gou-
lash communism" was evolving into Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost
and, ultimately perestroika. The meltdown of autocracy had begun
prior to the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl, although the potency of
civil society in opposition to totalitarian government was more evident
in Warsaw Pact states such as Hungary and Poland than in the Soviet
Union itself.84 JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR
SUCCEEDpassim (2005).85 id.
86 id.
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land, ruling elites commandeered scarce resources for
themselves, neglecting the people without whose labor and
support the enterprise was doomed.87 As a consequence, it
was only a matter of time before resources ran dry and the
civilization collapsed. 88 The theory that collapse (or, in
less extreme cases, major economic deprivation) was not an
inevitable consequence of natural conditions is demonstrat-
ed by the differing fortunes of two peoples or political
systems inhabiting the same environment, such as the
Norse and Inuit in Greenland, or the Dominican Republic
and Haiti on the Caribbean island of Hispaniola. 89
A relatively small, elite group might temporarily
thrive by hoarding resources and exploiting the populace.
For a time, less fortunate people will perform menial jobs,
serve in an "all volunteer" army, pledge fealty to a "work-
er's paradise," and pay taxes in the forlorn hope that they,
too, will someday share in the community's wealth. But
faith in the community and participation in the common
enterprise ultimately collapses unless the community is
reasonably responsive to the needs of all. Even Machiavel-
li recognized that "[a] wise prince will establish institutions
that can protect lives and property, respect different spheres
of social organization, and help his subjects pursue their
livelihoods." 90 Benjamin Franklin put it more colloquially
during the American Revolution: "We must indeed all hang
together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately."
91
87 id.
88 id.
89 id.
9 0 JOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN
IDEA 58 (1999). Ehrenberg offers the following quotation from Ma-
chiavelli's The Prince: "A prince should also show his esteem for
talent, actively encouraging able men, and honoring those who excel in
their profession." Id.
91 Benjamin Franklin, Remarks at the signing of the Declaration of
Independence (July 4, 1776). See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUO-
TATIONS 323 (Elizabeth Knowles ed. 1999).
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Ultimately, we are all in the same boat. Better for us to all
row together to safety than to drop our oars and cannibalize
the weakest among us.
92
That is not to say that we all should be strapped into
our seats, beating out a cadence of strokes called out by a
single coxswain seated up front. The failure of commun-
ism has demonstrated how a centrally-controlled economy,
answering to the beat of a single drummer, stifles individu-
al initiative and sucks the oxygen out of community. We
seek other models. Diamond calls our attention to the
Netherlands, where rich and poor alike realized over the
years that they would have to collaborate on an extensive
system of dikes and pumps in order to reclaim the land
from the sea. 93 A large storm that took 2,000 lives in 1953
prompted the Dutch to redouble their efforts; a Dutch aca-
demician-friend of mine explains that the Deltawerken (the
massive reinforcement of the dykes and the damming of
some estuaries) stemmed in part from a "Churchillian feel-
ing that there was a war against the water, which required
sacrifices from all for a major effort to prevent any disaster
like that in the future." 94  Diamond quotes his Dutch
friend's description of life in the reclaimed lands, or "pold-
ers":
In the Netherlands, we have [an] expression,
'You have to be able to get along with your
enemy, because he may be the person operating
the neighboring pump in your polder.' And
For the legal consequences of the latter, see Her Majesty the Queen
v. Dudley, (1884) 14 Q.B.D 273 (D.C.).
93 DIAMOND, supra note 84.
94 E-mail from Wibren Van der Burg, Tilburg Univ., to author, (Feb.
11, 2007) (in author's files). The legendary British Prime Minister's
name was invoked to signify the gravity of this immense national
effort, led by "a reasonably effective government that saw itself as the
leading agency in rebuilding the country and a minimally just and
solidaristic society after WWII." Id.
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we're all down in the polders together. It's not
the case that rich people live safely up on tops
of the dikes while poor people live down in the
polder bottoms below sea level. If the dikes
and pumps fail, we'll all drown together .... If
global warming causes polar ice melting and a
world rise in sea level, the consequences will
be more severe for the Netherlands than for any
other country in the world, because so much of
our land is already under sea level. That's why
we Dutch are so aware of our environment.
We've learned through our history that we're
all living in the same polder, and that our sur-
vival depends on each other's survival. 95
Comments Diamond:
That acknowledged interdependence of all
segments of Dutch society contrasts with cur-
rent trends in the United States, where wealthy
people increasingly seek to isolate themselves
from the rest of society, aspire to create their
own separate virtual polders, use their own
money to buy services for themselves privately,
and vote against taxes that would extend those
amenities as public services to everyone else.
Those private amenities include living inside
gated communities, relying on private security
guards instead of the police, sending one's
children to well-funded private schools with
small classes rather than to the under-funded
crowded public schools, purchasing private
health insurance or medical care, [and] drinking
bottled water instead of municipal water. . ..
Underlying such privatization is a misguided
95 DIAMOND, supra note 84, at 519-20.
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belief that the elite can remain unaffected by
the problems of society around them: the atti-
tude of those Greenland Norse chiefs who
found that they had merely bought themselves
the privilege of being the last to starve.
96
The collective effort in the Netherlands shaped an
environmentally conscious community in which capitalism
has nevertheless thrived more than in most places on
earth.97 That care for the collective good would be condu-
cive to a thriving capitalist economy should not really come
as a surprise. Indeed, no lesser proponent of capitalism
than Adam Smith recognized long ago that
[n]o society can surely be flourishing and
happy, of which the far greater part of the
members are poor and miserable. It is but
equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe,
and lodge the whole body of the people,
should have such a share of the produce of
their own labour as to be themselves tolera-
bly well fed, clothed, and lodged. 98
As we shall see, however, those who would promote indi-
vidual initiative and an equitable distribution of resources
face special problems in the United States.
96 Id. at 520.
97 My Dutch friend explains that the polder boards may have been the
first democratic institutions in the Netherlands and account for the
country's egalitarian and democratic culture. Van der Burg, supra note
94.
98 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 33 (1776).
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III. IN SEARCH OF A COHERENT GOVERNMENT ROLE.
A. A nation of tax protestors.
The United States of America is a nation founded
by tax protesters. The cry of the American Revolution was
"no taxation without representation"-a call for representa-
tive democracy at least as much as a revolt against taxes; a
political protest as much as a tax revolt. Nevertheless, anti-
tax, and with it, anti-government, sentiment is very much a
part of the national DNA. King George III and his troops
represented repressive government; ergo, government must
be inherently repressive.99 The centralization of power in
particular was to be avoided. Hence, a loose confederacy
of states was formed to succeed British imperial rule.
When that proved ineffectual, a federal government was
formed, in which constituent states would nevertheless
remain sovereign and retain many important government
powers. Government power was to be divided among gov-
ernments with different competencies (i.e., the "division of
powers" between the national government and the states);
within each government, "separation of powers" was to
keep any one branch from exercising too much power. A
Bill of Rights, setting forth individual civil liberties in the
form of limitations on government power (e.g., "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." 100), became an
important part of the constitution of the new republic.
Government was a necessary evil, but an evil nevertheless,
to be constrained and divided.
99 A variation on this type of thinking might be found in contemporary
Russia. Under Soviet rule, Russians were told that capitalism was
corrupt; capitalists were portrayed in caricature as greedy, dishonest,
and underhanded. With the decline and fall of communism, Russians
seem to have believed their propagandists and embraced the most
corrupt form of capitalism. The caricature has become the fact.
100 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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The result was a country in which criticism, suspi-
cion, and even derision of government is regarded as patri-
otic. A special target of this derision is the central
government in Washington. Politicians from Thomas Jef-
ferson to George W. Bush have campaigned against Wash-
ington (the government, not the man, although there is
reason to believe that Jefferson secretly schemed against
the man as well' 0 1). Ronald Reagan built his political ca-
reer on the following idea: the problem is not solved by
government, the problem is government.
Anti-government sentiment is the exclusive domain
of neither the left nor the right. Democrats, like Jefferson
(author of the Kentucky Resolutions10 2), Madison (princip-
al drafter of the limited-powers Constitution), Jackson (foe
of the Bank of the United States), Bryan (the prairie popul-
ist), and Carter have dueled in anti-government rhetoric as
have Republicans like the Tafts (three of them), Coolidge
("the chief business of the American people is
ness" 103), Reagan, and the Bushes (again, three of them).
The rhetoric often takes on a populist, anti-lawyerly com-
plexion. Peanut farmers (Jimmy Carter) and bodybuilders-
cum-Hollywood celebrities (Arnold Schwarzenegger) re-
peatedly remind voters, during political campaigns that
they are neither lawyers nor politicians, as if professional
training in the law or a life of public service is a form of
taint. But American lawyers, too, regard it as their sacred
duty to protect citizens against government power. The
101 See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 482-83 (Touchstone 2001).
102 The Kentucky Resolutions, like Madison's Virginia Resolutions,
stated a case for nullification of acts of Congress deemed unconstitu-
tional by the state legislatures. Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolu-
tions, in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1 JANUARY 1798 TO
31 JANUARY 1799 550-56 (Princeton Univ. Press 2003); WILLIAM J.
WATKINS, JR., RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE KEN-
TUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS AND THEIR LEGACY 170-71 (2004).
103 President Calvin Coolidge, Address to the American Society of
Newspaper Editors in Washington D.C. (Jan. 25, 1925).
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crusading attorney, in both fact and fiction-Clarence Dar-
row, Atticus Finch, Thurgood Marshall-is seen at his
heroic best when defending the criminally accused against
an abusive government or challenging unfair or discrimina-
tory government practices.
Even our national symbols have an anti-
government, rugged individualist aura about them. The
vigilant serpent of "Don't Tread on Me" fame was suc-
ceeded by a solitary eagle, a free-flying bird of prey, not a
pack animal like the wolf or a communitarian species like
the beaver (although Oregonians favor the latter). The
Father of Our Country, George Washington, is portrayed as
a Cincinnatus, disdainful of high office, eager to return to
the plow, accepting both a military commission and the
Presidency only with great reluctance. 104
Yet for all the bashing of government, we expect
government to perform when the chips are down. At one
time, apparently, it did. In the days following the San
Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906, with the city in ruins
and thousands left homeless, at least one citizen was moved
104 The myth is only partially correct. Washington did resist imperial
trappings and titles as President and established the two-term tradition
(ignored by Franklin Roosevelt, then codified in the Twenty-second
Amendment). But he was a master politician, inventing several gov-
ernment institutions that survive to this day, successfully balancing off
personalities as diverse and contentious as Hamilton, Jefferson, and
Adams, and fending off all sorts of challenges. As for his military
command, Washington showed up at the Continental Congress in 1775
dressed in full military officer regalia. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, 1776,
49-50 (Simon & Schuster 2005). What could he have been suggesting?
To his credit, Washington established the appropriate image
for the general-cum-politician in America. Military leaders who have
obtained high political office in this country have been the modest, self-
effacing, peace-loving sorts who have seen war and wish not to revisit
its horrors. We tend to elect and admire the Washingtons, Grants,
Eisenhowers, and Powells, not the strutting, autocratic McClellands,
MacArthurs, Pattons, and LeMays. We run (as we should) from the
man-on-horseback, the Caesar, or Napolean who will sweep us off our
feet and lay waste to our liberties.
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to write, "Everything's ruined. But don't worry; govern-
ment is looking out." 105 The observation seems to have
been accurate. Federal troops, after some initial blunders,
soon thereafter brought relief to a homeless and stranded
population. Within ten days, a new trolley line was up and
running; the twenty-eight thousand buildings destroyed by
the quake would be replaced by 20,500 new ones within
three years. 10 6 Public and private resources combined to
build a new City by the Bay. Even a corrupt municipal
administration rose to the occasion.
The recent New Orleans experience stands in sharp
contrast. Even now, two years after Katrina, deliverance
seems almost as remote as in the days immediately follow-
ing the storm. As of yet, no clear-cut game plan or consen-
sus as to how to rebuild the city and its environs exists.
Instead, the Big Easy seems to be adrift. 107 Part of the
problem is a cacophony of interest groups unwilling to lay
their respective demands aside for the common good. But
a century of disillusionment has also driven American gov-
ernment from a "can do" to a "won't do" mentality. 108
Americans spend 350 days a year bashing govern-
ment, starving it of resources, at least in those areas in
105 PBS American Experience: The Great San Francisco Earthquake
(produced and directed by Tom Weidlinger), transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/earthquake/filmmore/pt.html (Mar. 20,
2006).106 id.
107 A metaphor for this drift may be the shrimp boats washed ashore
during Katrina, which remained tangled in the trees in Gulf Coast
communities ten months later. Dan Barry, 100-Ton Symbols of a
Recovery Still Suspended, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2006, at Al.
'0' Perhaps we are just sadder but wiser. During the "can-do govem-
ment" era of the New Deal, Americans from Franklin Roosevelt to
Woody Guthrie extolled the virtues of massive federal reclamation and
irrigation projects such as the Grand Coulee and Bonneville Dams.
Today, we have come to recognize that an environmental price must be
paid for such "progress." We may have become less sure-headed and
more circumspect about such matters.
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which intervention might matter most. We spend the re-
maining two weeks deploring government's inability to
respond to the crisis of the moment: a hurricane in the Gulf,
landslides in California, wildfires in the Rockies, floods in
New England. Of course, few people really want the cessa-
tion of all government. Most societies have been formed
by people who recognized the need to band together to
protect common interests. Those societies quickly adopted
some sort of governance system. It may have been more or
less authoritarian in structure; it may have been more or
less oppressive to individual citizens or outsiders who come
into their midst; it may have been more or less tolerant of
free thinking or non-conformity on the part of individuals.
All too frequently, the broad common interests that created
the governing instrument in the first place have been aban-
doned in the course of rent-seeking efforts of individuals
and limited interest groups, or in selfish efforts to accumu-
late wealth or power on the part of individuals. Thus, in the
Soviet Union, Marxist-Leninism, a flawed, authoritarian
form of government that nevertheless had the welfare of the
masses as its core principle, quickly gave way to Stalinism,
a more oppressive form of Marxism whose chief aim
seemed to be the preservation in power of a totalitarian
leader. 109 In Africa, the promise of liberation from colonial
rule frequently turned sour, as despotic rulers plundered
national assets for personal gain. In America, the Republi-
can Party, an organization formed with the noblest of
aims-the curtailment of slavery and the enhancement of
opportunity-has lately fallen into the hands of a coalition
of corporate oligarchs and religious zealots, with adverse
consequences for the Republic.
110
109 These circumstances have been portrayed in an allegorical fashion in
literature. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (Penguin
Group 1945).110 For a detailed description of this phenomenon, see generally KEvIN
PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY (2006).
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A Hobbesian view of the world would suggest that
this is the natural state of things. Under Thomas Hobbes'
philosophy, power is accumulated in a governing authority
because men would otherwise be at each other's throats.
Life is "nasty, brutish and short," and people willingly cede
whatever natural rights they possess in return for the pro-
tection of a leviathan who will shield them from external
and internal threats.111 Under this view, the pursuit of self-
interest on the part of the ruling oligarchy is but a deal
struck with the devil. Some crumbs might be thrown to the
populace, but its claim to civil liberties is abandoned in
favor of protection against the Hun, the Turk, the Bolshe-
viks, or Al-Qaeda. The more liberal Lockean view regards
things differently. According to John Locke, individuals
group together to serve their mutual interests, including
self-protection, but in doing so they retain certain basic
civil liberties. 112 These "natural rights" are not to be inter-
fered with by the governing powers; to the extent intrusions
are permitted, they must be balanced against civil liber-
ties. 113 The bombing of Pearl Harbor may justify war on
Japan, but it does not justify the internment of American
citizens of Japanese ancestry. Taxes may be collected and
people may be conscripted into military service, but the
government may not arbitrarily drag us from our homes at
night or beat confessions out of its citizens.
B. Rights and responsibilities.
Communitarians are apt to reject the authoritarian-
ism implicit in the Hobbesian view and are therefore more
likely to embrace the Lockean, "natural rights" view. But
communitarians will be quick to add that with rights come
111 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. 1 ch. 13 (1651).
112 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
(1690).
13 Id.
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responsibilities, and that the assertion of individual rights
does not mean disregard for the needs of the community at
large. In America, however, the impulse against invasive
government power runs strong-so strong that we are re-
luctant to have government play the major role in promot-
ing social welfare that is taken for granted in most
economically advanced societies. Our health care system is
a prominent example of this phenomenon. Resistance to a
comprehensive national health care system has been articu-
lated on a number of grounds: the right to chose one's own
physician, the right of doctors to be independent contrac-
tors, the efficiencies and choices arguably provided by an
array of competing health insurance plans. But communi-
tarians are apt to downplay the "rights talk," recognizing,
as Mary Ann Glendon does, that most public controversies
are best resolved through an adjustment of competing inter-
ests. 114 Refraining the issue as an interests-based discus-
sion frees us to consider whether nationally-guaranteed
health coverage might benefit the nation as a whole and
whether a single-payer (or even just a single-form) health
insurance program might be more efficient than a system in
which each doctor must employ a cadre of specialists just
to process the forms required by a patchwork quilt of insur-
ers. Our Canadian neighbors enjoy universal health care 115
and more-more extensive public transportation,1 16 large
subsidies for higher education, 117 and stacks of firewood
free for the taking in national parks. Nevertheless, my
occasional forays to the north have unearthed no sense of
114 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 15 (1991).
115 Judy Foreman, Why Canadians Are Healthier, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 10, 2004, at C2.
116 Michael R. Baltes, The Importance Customers Place on Specific
Service Elements of Bus Rapid Transit, 6 J. OF PUB. TRANSP. 1, 5, 18
(2003).
117 Martin Trow, From Mass Higher Education to Universal Access:
The American Advantage, 37 MINERVA 303, 304, 317-319 (1999).
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oppression or restraint of freedom on the part of Canadian
citizens. Perhaps the absence of the responsibilities of a
superpower-and the hubris that goes with it-provides
our Canadian neighbors with an air of freedom and a lighter
step to their feet. Or perhaps it is a stronger sense of com-
munity that allows them to recognize that health care is a
universal need, the availability of which should be depen-
dent upon neither wealth nor employment status.
C. The tragedy of the commons.
Communitarian theory suggests that when possible,
government responsibility should be vested in the smallest
units, as they are most likely to be responsive to the needs
of the community. 118 But communitarianism sometimes
requires broader government responsibility as to human
needs. In America, the impulse against centralization of
government power runs almost as strong as the antipathy
toward government in general. Whether our federal system
is the cause or the effect of resistance to central authority,
there is great reluctance to place the federal government in
charge of many aspects of public life that are entrusted to
central authority in other countries. School finance is a
prominent example of this phenomenon. In France (to cite
just one case), public education is regarded as a major re-
sponsibility of the central government. 119 Approximately
two-thirds of all school funding comes out of Paris, and the
quality of one's education is not a by-product of the wealth
of one's hometown. 20  In America, the regard for local
control is strong. Control over and financing of schools is
118 AMrrAI ETZIONI, The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights
and Responsibilities, in THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNrrY: RIGHTS, RESPON-
SIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 260 (1993).
119 Embassy of France in the United States, Education in France: The
School System, http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/edu-fr.asp (last
visited Jan. 15, 2008).120 id.
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largely a local matter. 121 The state might take some inter-
est, but Washington is banished to the far comers of public
education. 122 The quality and type of education one rece-
ives in America thereby becomes largely a function of the
wealth and attitudes of one's local community-and the
results, of late, have been deplorable. 123
They have been deplorable at least in part because
many localities-even many that could not be considered
''poor" by any means-starve their public school systems.
This starvation subsists because while the greatest carping
about government power, size, and expenditures is reserved
for the federal government, people have the most direct
influence over taxes and expenditures on the local level. In
some states, like New York and New Jersey, voters must
approve school budgets through direct referendum. 124
Elsewhere, a school board member is only a telephone call
121 Some exceptions exist. Hawaii, for example, fmances all public
education through the state treasury. See Haw. Const. art. 10, § 1. See
generally HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1303 (Supp. 2006) (articulating
how the school budget and general fund are estimated).
122 Washington's primary involvement appears to be in the form of
unfunded mandates: decrees that states and local school districts must
comply with certain requirements as a condition for federal funding,
then paltry appropriations with respect to such funding. One such
example can be found in provisions for special education for students
with disabilities. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Im-
provement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004);
see also No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115
Stat. 1425 (2002).12 3 See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMER-
ICA'S SCHOOLS 3-5 (1992) (detailing inequities in America's public
schools). In Chile, students, who are painfully aware of such inequi-
ties, have recently taken to the streets in opposition to a Pinochet-era
law that delegates education funding to local communities and private
enterprise. See Larry Rohter, Chileans Promised a New Deal: Now
Striking Youth Demand It, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 2006, at Al 1. Thus, an
avowedly socialist government has fallen short of the egalitarian ideal.124 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 13-17 (West 1999); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
2022 -2023 (McKinney 2000).
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away-and unlike the congressional representative, she is
likely to answer the phone personally. The tragedy of the
commons takes hold, as elderly and childless voters, not
seeing a direct stake in the education of young people, rail
against high taxes, "bloated" school budgets, and "overpa-
id" teachers. 125 Having little recourse over state and federal
budgets, they use what leverage they can to control expend-
itures at the local level.
For decades, America's public schools were subsi-
dized by the practice of sex discrimination. Women, large-
ly excluded from professions such as law and medicine,
turned to nursing and teaching, for which they (and the
smaller number of males who opted for these callings)
accepted wages that would have been below market in a
truly free market, i.e., a market free of discrimination.
Now, with the more lucrative professions open to women,
the private-sector nursing market has begun to pay com-
petitive wages. 126 Teachers, most of whom work in a pub-
licly-financed school system, continue to earn depressed
wages. The profession is gradually depleted of its best
talent, who seek more lucrative positions elsewhere. To
extend the commons analogy, it now costs more to grow
the grass, but the public is unwilling to recognize the scar-
city of seed and foot the bill.
What is lacking here is a broad sense of community.
Last year my new research assistant, recently exposed to
communitarianism, asked me how broadly we can define
community. A core question, to be sure. With respect to
some interests, it might be altogether appropriate to define
one's community as narrowly as one's immediate family,
121 The tragedy of the commons takes hold when a public resource (i.e.,
the commons) is depleted because individuals are unwilling to regulate
their use or pay the price necessary to sustain the resource. See Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
126 Cheryl L. Mee, Salary, NURSING 2005, Oct. 2005, at 46, 48.
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or one's church, or one's neighborhood. 127 But some func-
tions (and I would contend that education is one of them)
require the financial commitment of an entire nation. For
still other purposes, such as the environment, our concerns
are that of a global community. In matters such as educa-
tion and the environment our interests are so interwoven
that it is, in the long run, just as self-defeating to narrow
one's perspective to one's family or even one's town as it
was for the Norse chiefs described by Diamond to horde
Greenland's scarce resources. 128
The problems of health care and public education
have together come to a head in my local school district.
Our local teachers worked last year without a contract, and
our little town endured a short strike, because the school
board insisted that the teachers contribute more of their
own funds to their health insurance plan.129 While a con-
tribution in the amount demanded by the board was un-
precedented for our area's public schools, the squeeze is
not unlike those faced by any number of employers, locally
and nationally. General Motors, Delta Airlines, Wal-Mart,
and our local grocer and automobile mechanic all must face
rising health care premiums while selling goods and servic-
es in a competitive environment. In America, the mix of
public and private resources has generally served us well,
but an over-reliance on employers as the major source of
health insurance has crippled them against international
competition, subjected them (like our doctors) to increasing
amounts of red tape, and exacerbated labor strife all over
America. Greater recognition of public and national re-
sponsibility in this regard may not only make health care
accessible to all; it might allow Americans to get on with
127 ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. & ROBERT M. ACKERMAN, LAW AND
COMMuNY: THE CASE OF TORTS 5 (2004).
128 DIAMOND, supra note 84, at 248-76.
129 Full disclosure requires me to note that my wife is one of our local
school teachers.
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business in a more globally competitive manner. Only our
distaste for "big government" stands in the way.
D. "Painless" solutions.
Some of the rancor in our own school district is a
product of uncertainty regarding the future of Pennsylva-
nia's system of public school finance. Recent experience
in that area provides some contrasts of particular interest to
communitarians. For the past several years, a Democratic
governor and a Republican legislature have tangled over a
funding scheme that would employ gambling proceeds
from slot-machines to reduce the tax burden. This "pain-
less" approach to public finance works as a regressive tax
on the poor and hides the true cost of government services.
Rarely mentioned is the moral question of whether we
should finance our children's education through a blue-
smoke-and-mirrors scheme dependent upon gambling
money drawn disproportionately from a low-income clien-
tele.
A more communitarian approach to school finance
is demonstrated by a program adopted by some fourteen
Pennsylvania school districts. These districts accept in-
kind services from senior citizens in lieu of taxes. 130 Se-
niors serve as teachers' aides, lunchroom monitors, cross-
ing guards, and tutors in exchange for tax forgiveness. The
need for tax relief on the part of skilled, public-spirited
citizens on fixed incomes is matched with the schools'
needs for a variety of services that might otherwise not be
provided. And, as Robert Putnam suggests in Bowling
130 Madelyn Pennino, Young and old, learning-Retirees tutor at
school's 'lab', INTELLIGENCER J., Jan. 28, 2008, at B 1; Dena Pauling,
Seniors Who Volunteer May Get $500 Tax Break, Aging Homeowners
Could be Paid for Work, CENTRE DAILY TIMES, Sept. 16, 200, at 1.
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Alone, the direct engagement of these citizens provides
value in a way that mere check-writing cannot. 131
IV. RECURRENT COMMUNITARIAN THEMES.
We can no longer delude ourselves with sugar-
coated facts, "painless" solutions, or other blue-smoke-and-
mirrors exercises, nor will the old partisan rhetoric or "left
versus right" labels suffice. Instead, we must begin to
consider the role of government with maturity and honesty.
Throughout this essay, we have encountered a number of
communitarian themes that can help us address this issue in
a principled manner, unencumbered by conventional politi-
cal rhetoric or alignments. 132 They may be summarized as
follows:
A. How much government?
This essay opened with the sad examples of Katrina
and Chernobyl, because they demonstrate the unfortunate
results that can be obtained from two extreme philosophies
of government: that of too much and of not enough gov-
ernment. We must ask: How much government is enough?
To what purposes is government legitimately and most
effectively employed? At what point does government
intervention intrude too dearly on civil liberties? When is
economic development and human progress best left to
private enterprise?
131 See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND RE-
VIVAL OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 116 (2000).
132 Using new language to confront problems can free us from doctrinal
rhetoric and ancient commitments, but it can be disturbing to those who
seek comfort in familiar labels. George Gershwin's masterpiece, Porgy
and Bess, confounded critics, because they did not know how to cha-
racterize a unique operatic composition for the Broadway stage about
African-Americans by a Jewish-American composer of popular music
and show tunes.
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Traditionally, this inquiry has been framed as a ten-
sion between individual liberties and public welfare, with
the implication that whatever balance we strike, we are
dealing with a zero-sum game. Politically, this tension
often reduces to a superficial left/right struggle, with those
on the left generally arguing for greater government inter-
vention to promote the general welfare and those on the
right suggesting that overall welfare is best advanced by
limiting state intervention and maximizing individual liber-
ty and initiative. When the discussion turns to national
defense and security issues, however, the roles are, more
often than not, reversed in American political discourse,
with conservatives tending to defer to government preroga-
tives to promote security for all and liberals suggesting, as
Benjamin Franklin did, that "Tho[s]e who would give up
ESSENTIAL LIBERTY to purcha[s]e a little TEMPORARY
SAFETY, de[s]erve neither LIBERTY nor SAFETY." 133
As a general philosophy, communitarians reject
both the extremes of radical individualism and repressive
authoritarianism. In the words of Amitai Etzioni, the
communitarian movement's founder, "A Communitarian
perspective recognizes both individual human dignity and
the social dimension of human existence." 134 Thus, while
government power is to be constrained by individual civil
liberties, government is nevertheless respected as a vehicle
(but not the exclusive vehicle) for social organization, as is
the need for some government intrusion in furtherance of
the greater good, be it in the form of taxes, military con-
scription, economic regulation or, where warranted,
searches of private persons and property. While govern-
ment is neither the exclusive nor even necessarily the best
means of promoting social welfare, communitarians recog-
133 See ROBERT JACKSON, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITU-
TION AND GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1759) (quotation appears
on the title page and is widely attributed to Ben Franklin).
134 AMITAI ETZIONI, supra note 118, at 253.
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nize that it plays an essential role in this endeavor. In this
regard, communitarians do not feel obliged to adhere to the
political orthodoxies of the left or the right. And while
most communitarians would assert that all persons possess
certain natural rights, we recognize that most conflict situa-
tions call for a mutual adjustment of interests, rather than a
contest as to whose rights trump those of others. 1
35
A communitarian view calls for neither government
abdication nor totalitarianism. At certain times and with
respect to certain ventures, government plays a necessary
and critical role, be it contending with a major hurricane,
defending the nation against terrorism, or educating our
young people. Sometimes it takes a village-or a state, or
a nation-to perform tasks essential to sustained existence
and development. The quandary is in determining just how
much government intervention is necessary to create oppor-
tunities for individuals to thrive, without stifling the initia-
tive of those same individuals. Across-the-board bromides
and political sloganeering do us little good here. Rather, a
healthy dose of pragmatism is in order. Delineating the
limits of government intervention and responsibility, con-
sistent with notions of communitarianism, is a core inquiry
necessary to the resolution of a multitude of problems we
face in a changing world.
B. How much law?
An issue closely related to that of the extent of gov-
ernment intervention is how much law is needed to de-
scribe the parameters of that intervention. Our agenda will
sometimes require structural reforms or other legislation.
Universal health insurance and environmental regulation
(including even market-based regulation, such as a carbon
tax) require statutory measures to take hold. Many such
reforms, because of the complexity of the problems they
135 GLENDON, supra note 114, at 18-19.
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seek to address, will additionally require administrative
regulations for their implementation. Congress may enact a
carbon tax and might even include in such legislation a rate
of taxation, but it would remain for an administrative agen-
cy to determine how much carbon, subject to the tax, is
emitted from any given activity (or at least determine a way
of measuring it). Because many of our adjustments are
subtle, the scalpel will sometimes be more effective than
the meat cleaver. Garrett Hardin said several decades ago,
"Prohibition is easy to legislate (though not necessarily to
enforce); but how do we legislate temperance? Experience
indicates that it can be accomplished best through the med-
iation of administrative law." 1
36
But as Hardin acknowledged, administrative law "is
rightly feared for an ancient reason-Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?-'Who shall watch the watchers them-
selves? ' '" 137 Indeed, more often than not, taking responsi-
bility requires not more law, but more responsible
administration of existing law. Hardin continued, "The
great challenge facing us now is to invent the corrective
feedbacks that are needed to keep custodians honest. We
must find ways to legitimate the needed authority of both
the custodians and the corrective feedbacks."'' 38
Ultimately, more responsible administration of ex-
isting law will occur only through the active engagement of
the citizenry. Congress can enact a ban on budgetary ear-
marks; it can just as easily revoke the ban. 139 Congress can
create FEMA to respond to disasters; it can also continue to
confirm the appointment of inept FEMA directors. A vigi-
136 Hardin, supra note 125, at 1246.
137 d. at 1245-46.
131 Id. at 1246.
139 Apparently, divided government in and of itself does not guaranty
prudence. A supposedly reform-minded Democratic Congress, purpor-
tedly committed to eliminating earmarks, nevertheless managed to
insert a few into its first budget in 2007. Robert Pear, Select Hospitals
Reap a Windfall Under Child Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2007, at Al.
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lant public, aided by the press, is the best insurance against
lapses in official morality and competence. In this regard,
the solution is more often political rather than legal.
A generation of Americans (and in particular,
American lawyers) has seen how the courts in dramatic
cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education,14 1 have ef-
fected major transitions in society. As a consequence,
many of us have adopted a post-Brown mentality, in which
recourse to reformist litigation is seen as a cure-all for the
nation's ills. We should continue to avail ourselves of the
courts and the Constitution to preserve human rights. The
rights secured under Brown were critical to a nation that
needed to rid itself of the oppression of an apartheid sys-
tem. But breakthrough cases like Brown, signaling a major
reordering of society, come by about once in a lifetime.
When the debate is more appropriately framed as an ad-
justment of interests, rather than as a competition among
rights, the political process, rather than the judicial process,
becomes the proper forum for decision-making. No writ of
mandamus will make Michael Brown a competent FEMA
Director; no judicial directive will craft a wise foreign
policy. The Supreme Court might declare the regulation of
greenhouse gases within EPA jurisdiction, 141 but the EPA
must still carry out the Court's mandate. Judicial and legis-
lative remedies can take us only so far. The body politic
must demand more of its elected and appointed employees.
C. The role of civil society.
Perhaps equally important as government to the
building and sustaining of community is the role of private
organizations and institutions. What political scientists call
"civil society"-a tapestry of voluntary associations such
as civic clubs, neighborhood organizations, corporations,
140 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
141 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007).
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labor unions, religious institutions, charitable organizations,
educational institutions, and even Putnam's bowling lea-
gues-plays a vital role in creating and maintaining the
social capital that allows societies to thrive. Sometimes
(and in some societies), these organizations stand in oppo-
sition to government authority, but in democracies, these
organizations usually act in tandem with government, as
mediating elements through which individuals join together
for social or economic action. "[C]ivil society [is] the
space between the individual and the state, the area where
private institutions, voluntary associations, free markets,
the free expression of ideas, and the free exercise of reli-
gion can be imagined or realized." 142 Voluntary and auto-
nomous organizations "not only mediate between the
individual and the state, ... they also help make the 'life of
a society more full, rich, and varied."'
' 143
In his book, Better Together, Robert Putnam docu-
ments the efforts of a variety of community organizations
to improve the lot of the citizenry. 144 The organizations are
engaged in a variety of efforts: economic development,
neighborhood improvement, and literacy, to name a few.
For the most part, they involve grass-roots structures, or-
ganizations built from the ground up to deal with an identi-
fied problem or serve an identified clientele. While few of
these organizations are government agencies per se, almost
all of them use government as a means of advancing their
mission. While in some regimes, civil society must act as a
"parallel polis," in opposition to the state (e.g., the Solidari-
ty movement in Communist Poland), that need not be the
case in a democracy. "The civil society does not act in
opposition to the democratic state, but cooperates with
142 W. Robert Connor, The Idea of a Civil Society, Conference Intro-
duction 2 (National Humanities Center 1992).143 Id. at 2-3 (quoting Anne Firor Scott).
'44 ROBERT PUTNAM, BETTER TOGETHER: RESTORING THE AMERICAN
COMMUNIrrY (2003).
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it."' 145 Even in a democracy, however, civil society can
play a useful monitoring function. We should consider
how civil society may complement or supplant government
with respect to certain activities, recognizing that many
functions are best performed by voluntary associations that
lack some of the constraints, as well as the coercive power,
of government.
D. What level of government should intervene?
When government intervention is appropriate, at
what level should it intervene? As a general proposition,
communitarians would advocate government intervention
and regulation by the smallest governmental unit and at the
most local level possible. 146  The smallest governmental
units are most likely to be most responsive to immediate
needs and most likely to invoke the direct participation of
the individuals involved, thus wedding responsive govern-
ment to individual responsibility. We should be wary of
those projects (like Alaska's Bridge to Nowhere) conceived
to meet purely local "needs" but which the locals are unwil-
ling to fund on their own. 147 But some needs (the most
obvious of which is national defense) are so overwhelming
and universal so as to require governmental response on a
larger, more national scale. Some needs are intermediate in
nature. Should the federal government respond to a hurri-
cane that has displaced thousands, or should the people of
New Orleans, or St. Charles Parish, or Louisiana, or Mis-
sissippi be left to respond on their own? What are the geo-
145 Bronislaw Geremek, Civil Society and the Present Age, in THE IDEA
OF A CIVIL SOCIETY 11, 18 (1992), available at
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/publications/civilsoc/geremek.htm
(last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
46 ETZIONI, supra note 118.
147 We should differentiate between such projects and those essential
functions such as education that address national needs but which some
localities are unable to fully fund.
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graphic dimensions of our "community"? Do they change
depending upon the circumstances addressed and the type
of intervention required? Does geography remain essential,
or is it even relevant to our definition of community in an
age of jet travel and electronic communications?
In the United States and some other countries, the
issue of the appropriate level of government response is
complicated by the principle of federalism, in which certain
entities (most notably, states and Indian tribes) are sove-
reigns with powers derived from sources other than the
central government. An American state or (to cite another
federal republic) German Land stands in a different rela-
tionship to the central authority in Washington or Berlin
than a French department or Chinese province has with
respect to Paris or Beijing. Does it make sense to regard
political subdivisions as sovereign units, or is this a matter
that should have been resolved definitively in the American
Civil War? Is a matter like public education (to cite just
one important example) a responsibility of each locality (as
in most of the United States), or is it regarded as a respon-
sibility of the much larger community embodied in the state
(as in France)?
E. Individual responsibility.
A fifth communitarian theme of interest to us is that
of personal versus institutional responsibility. Some activi-
ties justify government intervention and regulation; with
respect to others, we are better off taking responsibility for
ourselves. Should the government regulate, for example,
the extraction of natural resources from environmentally
fragile lands, or should we leave it to the judgment and
altruism of corporations engaged in the exploitation of non-
renewable mineral resources to serve as stewards of the
environment? Should the government regulate the market-
ing of junk food to toddlers (as the New York Times advo-
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cated in a 2006 editorial148), or should we leave it to parents
to act responsibly and monitor the dietary intake of their
children? Must the State of California subsidize protection
from mudslides for coastal communities, or should people
be left to decide whether they will themselves pay the price
of living in a dangerous environment (through exposure to
danger or the cost of protection), while enjoying the bene-
fits of an ocean view? Reasonable people will disagree
about these issues; in the very least, we should try to devel-
op a framework for their principled consideration, rather
than defaulting to "squeaky-wheel-gets-the-grease" no-
strums.
As a point of departure, I would suggest that the
case for individual, rather than collective, responsibility is
inversely correlated to the impact of one's conduct on oth-
ers. The dietary intake of one's children, for example, has
an impact that is far more localized than that of drilling for
oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Common sense,
as well as respect for individual liberties, suggests that
certain decisions-and the responsibility that goes with
them-should be the province of the smallest community
unit, the family. But that does not grant us license to ignore
the sufferings of others or the interconnectedness of hu-
manity. A broad range of human concerns demands our
engagement. We can isolate ourselves from neither geno-
cide in Darfur nor the implications of global climate
change.
F. Responsible intervention.
A related theme is the government's need to act
responsibly on our collective behalf. I have alluded earlier
to the problem of resorting to "painless" solutions to public
problems, like the accumulation of a growing amount of
148 Editorial, Selling Junk Food to Toddlers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
2006, at A26.
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public debt in lieu of raising taxes. These solutions are
really not painless at all, as they merely postpone the day of
reckoning and force members of the next generation to pay
for commitments their parents have made. Even those of
us who are so cautious as to minimize our personal debt
(more and more a rarity in our debt-obsessed culture) are
forced to take on our share of the public debt. Pay-as-you-
go strategies, on the other hand, have the additional benefit
of requiring the decision-maker to count the cost. 149 If a
war (on Iraq or on poverty) is not worth paying for, is it
really worth fighting? 150
Related to this inquiry is that of internalization of
costs. With respect to both public and private courses of
action, is it possible to internalize costs in such a way that
the actors pay the full price of their activities, including the
costs they might impose on others in the absence of regula-
tion? For example, might Americans become more prudent
in their consumption of non-renewable, carbon-based fuels,
and more frequently avail themselves of public transporta-
tion, if the environmental costs of driving were fully incor-
porated into the cost of gasoline? Market-based solutions,
such as the carbon tax, promote responsible decision-
making by making actors-be they individuals, corporate
bodies, or governments-count the costs. The role of gov-
ernment here becomes the proper assessment and enforce-
ment of the true costs of carbon use and emissions, so as to
eliminate the freeloader phenomenon that occurs when
149 The same case can be made for localization of decision making, and
the funding necessary to support it. If the potential users of an Alaskan
bridge-to-nowhere are unwilling to pay for it, why should Washington?
150 The "other people's money" problem discussed in the preceding
note finds its analogy in the war-making context, specifically the ex-
penditure of other people's lives. If we make war, we should be willing
to place our own lives at risk, not just those of the poor.
65
et al.: Vol 4 No 1
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
4:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 66
people are allowed to impose costs on others without pay-
ing the freight. 1
51
G. Regard for long-term consequences.
A corollary to the theme of responsibility is due re-
gard for the long-term consequences of one's actions, be
they private or public. While little of the communitarian
literature to date has focused on this theme, its relationship
to communitarianism is apparent. The following acts are
among those consistent with the theme of responsibility: to
pay one's own debts, to clean up one's own messes, and to
leave one's surroundings for the better, not the worse, for
one's having been here. Annual federal budget deficits
mean that someone else will have to pay for today's felt
necessities. Economic stimulants and foreign adventures
may be priorities, but previous generations fought two
world wars and a depression during the first half of the
twentieth century without encumbering us with a fraction
of the debt we now propose to pass on to our heirs. Envi-
ronmental responsibility may be of even greater impor-
tance, as the effects of environmental degradation can be
permanent in ways that deficits need not be. We cannot
dredge the Mississippi, mine the canyon lands of Utah, fill
the air with hydrocarbons, or contribute to the demise of
hundreds of other species without contemplating the conse-
quences. The old Native American saying holds true: The
land is not a gift from our ancestors; it is a loan from our
children.
Al Gore (who has long warned about the peril of
global warming) has suggested that "[w]hat changed in the
151 Government does this with regularity through the tort liability sys-
tem by making the courts available to people for redress against those
who have harmed them A carbon tax is a superior device in that it
carries with it a formulaic consistency and fairness not associated with
jury verdicts. It should incorporate the cost of resource depletion as
well as the cost of pollution.
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U.S. with Hurricane Katrina was a feeling that we have
entered a period of consequences."1 52 But public responsi-
bility for large-scale consequences has always been a more
difficult concept to embrace than that of individual respon-
sibility. Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the politics
of the day is the failure to account for the future conse-
quences of present-day policy. We plunge trillions of dol-
lars into debt, mortgaging our children's future to the
central banks of East Asia. We turn a blind eye toward
global warming, ascribing the threat to "junk science." We
commence a war on Iraq, declaring "mission accom-
plished," without contemplating the difficult occupation
that lies ahead.
What the first President Bush derisively referred to
as "the vision thing" may be the greatest deficit in current
formulations of public policy. Critics of the second Bush
Administration's environmental policies suggest that its
links to corporate America have caused it to place greed
above the common good. 153 But it may not be so much that
Bush and his loyalists are greedy; they may simply lack the
foresight to comprehend the long-term consequences of
their actions. During the Reagan Administration, Interior
Secretary James Watt's seeming disregard for the environ-
ment was attributed (probably unfairly) to an apocalyptic
vision: the long-term prospects for the environment were
thought to be of no consequence, because the physical
environment was about to be destroyed by the hand of
God. 154 An other-worldly view of things may similarly
affect current policies.
152AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH (Paramount Classics 2006).
153 See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE: How
GEORGE W. BUSH AND His CORPORATE PALS ARE PLUNDERING THE
COUNTRY AND HIJACKING OUR DEMOCRACY 190-99 (2004); PHILLIPS,
supra note 110.
15 See Phillips, supra note 110 at 63. Phillips suggests that Watt's
concern about an imminent Second Coming justified, in his mind,
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Alternatively, the lack of vision may have more
mundane explanations. The problem with the Katrina re-
sponse may have been similar to the recurring complaint
about the Pentagon-that our generals are always fighting
the last battle. In the post-9/11 period, the government
installed a vast and inconvenient security apparatus to pro-
tect the homeland from the last threat-that of terrorists
flying airplanes into skyscrapers-and neglected the next
one-an environmental calamity, caused by terrorists or
natural causes. Mother Nature may have treated us to Ka-
trina; the poisoning of urban drinking water or the unleash-
ing of a "dirty bomb" in some major metropolitan area may
be the next surprise Al-Qaeda has cooked up for us. In-
deed, people are working on this critical issue, but it does
not appear that our government has attached the urgency or
resources to the issue that it deserves. 1
55
It is not as if the party out of power excels at long-
term planning. If the Republicans have a time horizon of
about one month, the Democrats often seem to have a hori-
zon of seventy-five years-into the past. But efforts to
depart from this mind-set have produced mixed results.
Over a decade ago, in an effort to fashion a "third way,"
Clinton-era Democrats joined market-minded Republicans
in rejecting protectionism and embracing free trade. But by
failing to insist that our trading partners adopt measures to
protect labor and the environment, we may have placed our
own industries and workers at a disadvantage while exacer-
bating environmental degradation and exploitation of labor
in other parts of the world.
The traditional liberal nostrums of redistribution
and regulation have merit in some circumstances. Vast and
better stewardship of natural resources in anticipation of that reckon-
ing.
155 See Steve Coil, The Unthinkable: Can the United States Be Made
Safe from Nuclear Terrorism?, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 2007, at
48.
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still-growing disparities in wealth (and access to it) may
justify the former, and environmental imperatives may
require the latter. Not all solutions can be market-based.
But solutions that internalize externalities (e.g., by using a
carbon tax to incorporate environmental costs into prices)
may produce the most efficient results and remain largely
untried. Such solutions combine the best elements of the
conservative obsession with markets and the liberal infatua-
tion with regulation. 
156
The Dutch polder experience in the years following
World War II demonstrates how disparate political parties,
religious groups, and economic interests can unite for the
common good and address pressing needs. We must rec-
ognize that current security, environmental, and fiscal de-
mands are, like those that demanded the Dutch polder
effort, an existential matter. To confront these demands, a
new politics of community and responsibility must replace
the old partisan bickering. As Lincoln said in another era,
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to
the stormy present. The occasion is piled high
with difficulty, and we must rise with the occa-
sion. As our case is new, so we must think
156 Compare Clean Energy Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (2007) (as
passed by House), and Renewable Fuels, Consumer Protection, and
Energy Efficiency Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (2007) (as
amended and passed by Senate) (encompassing a variety of regulatory
measures, such as more stringent automobile mileage regulations), with
Robert B. Reich, The Best Idea for Reducing Global Warming, THE
AM. PROSPECT, June 20, 2007, available at
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article--the-best-idea-for-reducing
__global-warming_ (advocating cap-and-trade approach), and Interview
by Scott Jagow with Robert Reich, Professor of Public Policy at the
University of California at Berkley (June 20, 2007) (advocating carbon
tax).
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anew and act anew. We must disenthrall our-
selves, and then we shall save our country. 
157
H. Being a good neighbor.
The final communitarian theme we should address
is the importance of behaving as good neighbors. Being a
good neighbor means more than conforming to that which
is legally required. A focus on legal rights alone ignores
the informal relationships and voluntary undertakings that
are essential to the societal fabric. "Buried deep in our
rights dialect," writes communitarian Mary Ann Glendon,
"is an unexpressed premise that we roam at large in a land
of strangers, where we presumptively have no obligations
toward others except to avoid the active infliction of
harm." 158 It would be a sad land indeed if we regarded our
obligations to others as merely congruent with our legal
obligations and failed to recognize our interdependence.
Compare, if you will, the defensive, fearful post-Katrina
response of the officials of Gretna, Louisiana (who barred
dislocated New Orleans residents from their streets) with
that of their counterparts in Houston, Texas. By opening
their public facilities, their schools, and their arms to those
displaced by Katrina, Houston's citizens may have momen-
tarily diluted their material resources, but they built a price-
less store of social capital from which they are likely to
reap returns for years to come.
The same notion of "neighborliness" may be at-
tached to international affairs. In his recent book, From
Empire to Community, Amitai Etzioni envisions a transition
from a "might makes right" philosophy in foreign relations
to the development of institutions and communal bonds to
157 Abraham Lincoln, The President's State of the Union Address to
Congress (Dec. 1, 1862).
158 GLENDON, supra note 114, at 77.
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establish human primacy. 159  Gunboat diplomacy and
bombing raids may provide temporary gains, but in an age
of global terrorism, real security is obtained only through
collaboration.
Determining the parameters of effective govern-
ment action, recognizing both the potency and limitations
of law, delineating the boundary between public and pri-
vate, defining the role of civil society, discerning the re-
spective roles of governments at different levels, acting
responsibly, planning for the future, and caring for our
neighbors: these are considerations that can frame prin-
cipled discussion. As events from Chernobyl to Katrina
have demonstrated, these issues are too important to be
dispatched with familiar labels or partisan rhetoric. We
must honestly acknowledge inconvenient facts, engage in
principled discourse, and recognize that our future depends
on a web of relationships and the enlightened employment
of governance mechanisms.
To some, the principles suggested in this essay will
appear naive. Self-interest dominates human endeavor, the
public-choice theorists would say, and to profess otherwise
is wishful thinking worthy only of Pollyanna or Candide.
Government can never be trusted, the cynics warn us. But
disaster lies in the unmitigated pursuit of self-interest, just
as surely as it lies in the unfettered power of government.
The consequences of heedless pursuit of selfish ends at one
extreme, or of forfeiture of all initiative to government at
the other, are too dire, and furnish no realistic vision of a
livable future. Better for us to seek a proper balance, to
build community, and to trust what Lincoln called "the
better angels of our nature."' 6
0
159 AM1TAI ETZIONI, FROM EMPIRE TO COMMUNrrYpassim (2004).
160 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861).
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OPINION PIECE
REFORMING EMINENT DOMAIN IN TENNESSEE
AFTER KELO: SAFEGUARDING THE FAMILY FARM
Beau Pemberton*
Introduction
Take a journey back in time to the summer of 2005.
Visualize a seventy-five year old, widowed grandmother
living on her farm in rural Middle Tennessee. This thirty-
acre farm in the middle of the county is all that she has left
to call her own. The world has grown around her farm for
many years, inviting mini-malls, restaurants, condomi-
niums, and interstate ramps on all sides of this picturesque
setting. Now, imagine the grandmother's shock when she
receives a letter from the local Economic Development
Board notifying her that it is going to condemn her property
via eminent domain as part of the county's Master Eco-
nomic Redevelopment Plan.
The letter states that her land will serve as the relo-
cation site for a major automobile manufacturer, which will
bring eight hundred new jobs and nearly $2 million a year
in new tax revenues to the economically distressed county.
This redevelopment plan provides the public purpose that
justifies taking the land by eminent domain. Developers'
attractive monetary offers caused her former neighbors to
sell out and move away, but because the grandmother had
* J.D. candidate, University of Tennessee College of Law, graduating in
May, 2008, with a Concentration in Business Transactions; B.A.,
summa cum laude, 2005, The University of Tennessee at Martin. The
author would like to thank Dr. Otis Stephens, and his assistants, for
their invaluable guidance and input on this essay. The author dedicates
this essay to his wife, Stacey, and daughter, Sarah Elizabeth, and ex-
presses his thanks for their support and patience while writing this
piece.
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emotional ties to the property, she was determined to spend
the rest of her life on her farm. She was hardly reassured
by the promise that she would receive just compensation
for her taken property.
After recovering from the initial shock of the letter,
she visits her lawyer to determine her options. The lawyer
tells her that little can be done to stop the taking of her land
for this economic redevelopment plan or to stop the bull-
dozers that will make way for the new automobile factory.
Her only realistic recourse is to litigate over the amount of
money she will receive for her land and for the resulting
displacement from her home. This news is cold comfort to
her because it means that she will be forced to live out her
days somewhere else.
The above described scenario is similar to the expe-
rience of property owners in New London, Connecticut.
Their challenge to the taking of their property for economic
redevelopment purposes led to the 2005 landmark decision,
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), and
resulted in a ripple effect that is currently reforming emi-
nent domain law throughout the United States. To appre-
ciate how Kelo has affected Tennessee's eminent domain
law, the decision must be examined in detail.
Kelo v. City of New London's Facts
The Kelo litigation began when Susette Kelo, as
well as several of her neighbors in the Fort Trumbull area
of New London, Connecticut, challenged the taking of their
property under an economic redevelopment plan (Plan)
implemented by New London Development Corporation
(NLDC) and the City of New London (City).' The Plan's
original purposes were "to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to
increase tax.. . revenues, and to revitalize an economically
1 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005).
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distressed city."' 2  Several factors encouraged this Plan
including (1) the 1996 closing of the United States Gov-
ernment's Naval Undersea Warfare Center, located in the
Fort Trumbull area; (2) a city unemployment rate double of
that for all of Connecticut; and (3) a decreased city popula-
tion.3 The Plan intended to use the taken property for "the
creation of a Fort Trumbull State Park" on the former site
of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center; a $300 million
research facility for Pfizer, Inc., adjacent to the park; land
for a new Coast Guard Museum; and property set aside for
residential, commercial, retail, parking, and other purpos-
es.
4
During the Plan's initial stages, NLDC hosted a "se-
ries of neighborhood meetings to educate the public about
the process"' 5 and eventually won approval from state offi-
cials who determined that the plan "was consistent with
relevant state and municipal development policies." 6 After
state approval, NLDC finalized the Plan by focusing on a
ninety-acre tract in the Fort Trumbull area of New Lon-
don.7 In January 2000, New London's city council ap-
proved the Plan's final version and authorized NLDC to
acquire the Fort Trumbull property by purchase or by emi-
nent domain. 8  After purchase negotiations with Susette
2 Id. at 472.
3 Id. at 473.
4 Id. at 473-74. The Court notes that NLDC was attempting to capital-
ize on Pfizer's new research facility as a catalyst to meet the redeve-
lopment plan's original purposes of creating newjobs, tax revenues,
and New London's eventual revitalization. Id. at 473.
5 Id. at 473.
6 Id. at 473-74 n.2. Given the nature of this case, I wonder just how
effective the public meetings held by NLDC were at addressing con-
cems of the affected landowners.71d. at 474.8 ld. at 475.
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Kelo and her neighbors failed, NLDC initiated proceedings
to take their property by eminent domain. 9
After the eminent domain declaration by NLDC,
Kelo and several of her neighbors filed an action against
NLDC in state court and alleged that the taking was un-
constitutional under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution because the taking violated the Fifth
Amendment's "'public use' restriction."'" NLDC then
announced that it would enter into leasing agreements with
private companies, including Corcoran Jennison, to develop
the property.11 This arrangement appeared to be a harmless
way to meet the Plan's goals, but it essentially condemned
private land for the benefit of private individuals and de-
velopers. This arrangement strengthened the petitioner's
argument because the authors of the Fifth Amendment
presumably did not envision the taking of private land for
private use.
After a bench trial before the New London Superior
Court, the petitioners obtained a permanent restraining
order to prevent the taking of Parcel 4-A, but they lost
regarding Parcel 3.12 The petitioners appealed this incom-
plete victory to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which
sustained all the takings at issue. 13 First, the court upheld
the takings on statutory grounds, noting that the state's
9 d. Specifically, petitioners owned a total of fifteen properties in the
Fort Trumbull area, with four of the properties located in Parcel 3 of
the Plan, immediately north of the proposed Pfizer facility and eleven
of the properties located in Parcel 4-A of the Plan. Id. at 474. Parcel 3
was slated for office space, and Parcel 4-A was slated for a park or
manna usage. Id. at 476.
'
01 Id. at 475.
11d. at 476 n.4.
Id. at 475-76. The Court notes that this trial on the proposed takings
was a bench trial, which raises the question: Why did the petitioners not
demand a jury trial regarding the proposed takings because a jury
would likely have been more sympathetic to a landowner's concerns
than a governmental agency's plan? See id. at 475.
1Id. at 476.
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municipal development code expressed a clear legislative
determination that land taken for economic redevelopment,
regardless of whether it is developed, is still "a 'public use'
and in the 'public interest."' ' 14 Next, the court, adhering to
federal precedent, sustained the takings for the Plan's pro-
nounced public use. 15 Finally, the court analyzed whether
the takings were "'reasonably necessary' to achieving the
City's intended public use" and "whether the takings were
for 'reasonably foreseeable needs."" 6 This analysis pro-
duced a mixed result.
The three dissenting justices discussed the City's
failure to adduce evidence of future economic benefits
flowing from the Plan and the proposed takings. 17 The
dissent maintained that this lack of evidence should have
invalidated all of NLDC's takings as unconstitutional, de-
spite the Plan's intent "to serve a valid public use."" The
dissenting justices stated that a "'heightened' standard of..
review" was needed to evaluate these takings because
they were purely for economic redevelopment instead of
the typical eminent domain purposes (e.g. roads or parks). 19
Upon granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
observed that the main issue was "whether a city's decision
to take property for ...economic development satisfies"
the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement.2 0
14 id.
15 Id. (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Ber-
man v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).16 See id.
17 Id. at 477.
18 id.
19 Id.
20 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1 ("[N]or shall private proper-
ty be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
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The State of the Law before Kelo v. City of New London
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Kelo
is by no means a groundbreaking decision. For several
decades, the Court has maintained that whether a taking
satisfies the Fifth Amendment's public purpose require-
ment requires deference to legislative judgments governing
this area.2 1 The first landmark case in this area was Ber-
man v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), which the Court handed
down over fifty years ago.22 Berman dealt with a redeve-
lopment plan in Washington, D.C., and the plan for this
"blighted area" condemned the existing structures, includ-
ing Berman's department store, to make way for roads,
schools, and other public structures. 23 The rest of the con-
demned property was leased back to private parties for
further development, including low-income housing.
24
Berman parallels Kelo in that the petitioner challenged the
taking as inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment's public
use clause because another private party would eventually
control and redevelop the taken property.25
The Court's unanimous decision deferred to legisla-
tive determinations on what constituted a valid public use
under the Fifth Amendment. 26  The Court, speaking
through Justice William 0. Douglas, stated that it had no
right to overrule a public use determination because "Con-
21 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483.
22 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 26 (1954).
231Id. at 28-31.24 Id. This redevelopment plan arose "under the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act of 1945," which sought to eliminate blighted and
slum residential areas of the District as a way of fostering new and
publicly acceptable development. Id. at 28.
5 Id. at 31. Petitioner contended that taking his purely commercial
property (i.e. a department store) was inconsistent with the plan's stated
purpose of "ridding the area" of residential slum property and that
creating a "better balanced, more attractive community" is not a valid
public purpose to sustain the Act. Id.
Id. at 33.
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gress and its authorized agencies" had decided that this
redevelopment plan met several, well-established public
purposes, consistent with its police power function. 27 Fur-
thermore, the Court refused to dictate "the means of execut-
ing the [plan]" and noted that the plan's execution was
within the sole discretion of the legislature, including the
use of private enterprise for implementing the plan.28 Ber-
man should have been instructive to the Kelo petitioners
because both cases involved takings for public uses that
were less concrete than in a typical takings case.
29
Next, the Court discussed Hawaii Housing Authori-
ty v. Midkff, 469 U.S. 229 (1984), a landmark takings deci-
sion. Midkiff focused on the constitutionality of the
Hawaiian government condemning and taking residential
rental property from private landlords and transferring fee
simple title to the existing lessee living on the property.
30
The public purpose of Hawaii's law, titled the Land Reform
Act of 1967, was to break up the property oligopoly of a
relatively small number of individual landowners in Ha-
waii.31 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
holding that the statute was "a naked attempt ... of Hawaii
27 Id. at 32-35.
Id. at 33-34 ("We cannot say that public ownership is the sole me-
thod of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment
?rojects.").
For example, a typical takings case would likely involve the appropr-
iation of private land for a tangible public good, such as an interstate or
a post office. Berman's redevelopment plan, which included concrete
elements such as streets and parks as part of its public purpose, also
included less tangible and arguably more abstract elements such as
"prevent[ing], reduce[ing], or eliminate[ing] ... blight." Id. at 29.
Kelo's Plan followed a similar path because its public purposes in-
cluded parks and other public facilities and increased tax revenues and
economic revitalization. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 474 (2005).30 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233 (1984).
31 Id. at 232-33.
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to take the private property of A and transfer it to B solely
for B's private use and benefit."
32
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated that
"[t]he 'public use' requirement is. . . coterminous with the
scope of a sovereign's police powers" and that redistribut-
ing land and effectively eliminating an undesirable land
oligopoly via a compensated taking is clearly within a
state's police power justifying the use of eminent domain.33
The Court maintained that its role of reviewing legislative
determinations of public use was "'an extremely narrow'
one." 34 Reaffirming prior decisions, the Court stated that it
would not substitute its judgment for legislative determina-
tions of a public use "'unless the use [is] palpably without
reasonable foundation."' 35 The Court asserted that its focus
was not on the end-result behind the taking, but strictly on
the plan's public purpose for the takings and whether the
means for the plan's execution were rational.36
In closing, the Court reiterated its position that the
Fifth Amendment does not impose "any literal requirement
that condemned property be put into use for the general
public." 37 Specifically, the Court stated, "It is not essential
that the entire community, nor even any considerable por-
tion,.., directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in
order [for it] to constitute a public use." 38  In short, the
Court determined that the Hawaii statute, which utilized
32 Id. at 235.
33 Id. at 240-42.34 Id. at 240 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).35 Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160
U.S. 668, 680 (1896)); see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 32-35.36 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242-43. In addition, the Court stated that debat-
ing the wisdom of takings legislation and its attending public purposes
is improper in the federal courts.37 Id. at 244.38 Id. (quoting Rindge Co. v. L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923)).
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eminent domain, "pass[es] scrutiny of the Public Use
Clause."
39
In essence, both Berman and Midkiff set a deferen-
tial tone for the Court's review in takings cases when ex-
amining what constitutes a valid public use. The Kelo
Court, following this deferential tone, abandoned any idea
that the stated legislative purposes behind eminent domain
takings are simply post hoc rationalizations of the taking.
40
Interestingly, both Berman and Midkiff provide considera-
ble latitude to the possibility of private owners becoming
both the end-users and owners of property taken from their
neighbors by eminent domain.
These cases demonstrate that Kelo is not earth-
shattering takings jurisprudence, despite two decades sepa-
rating Midkiff and Kelo and over fifty years dividing Ber-
man and Kelo. The effects of Kelo have been aggrandized
because of an age in which newspapers, twenty-four hour
news channels, and internet news websites report and often
sensationalize stories, including United States Supreme
Court decisions. 4 1 The majority opinion in Kelo, while not
jurisprudentially novel, follows the past decisions of Ber-
man and Midkiff by holding that the taking of the petition-
39 d. at 243.
40 See Brief for the States of Vermont et. al. as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Respondents, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
(No. 04-108) (highlighting several states' positions, including Tennes-
see, that the courts should give deferential treatment to state determina-
tions of public use in takings cases and limit interference in this area by
the federal courts. This limited influence prevents unnecessary judicial
entanglement and is established precedent in the Court's takings juri-
sprudence).
41See e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Taking Property for
Development, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at Al; Assoc. Press, High
Court Expands Reach of Eminent Domain, Fox NEWS, June 23, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendly story/0,3566,160479,00.htm
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ers' land under an economic redevelopment plan was con-
stitutional under the Fifth Amendment. 
4 2
Analyzing the Kelo Decision
After writing the majority opinion in Kelo, Justice
John Paul Stevens attempted to set himself apart from the
decision, calling the outcome "unwise," but qualifying his
statement by adding that "the law compelled a result that
[he] would have opposed if [he] were a legislator."43 De-
spite Justice Stevens' misgivings, his majority opinion
began by emphasizing the Court's limited scope of review
and deference to legislative determinations of public use for
eminent domain. 44 The Court determined that the Plan at
issue "unquestionably serves a public purpose," thereby'
meeting the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement.
Specifically, the Court stated that "[p]romoting economic
development is a [longstanding objective] of government"
and that "there is . . . no other principled way of distin-
guishing economic development from . . . other public
purposes." 46 The Court explained that holding the benefits
derived from NLDC's Plan as an invalid public use would
be "incongruous" from its prior takings jurisprudence.47
Aside from sustaining NLDC's takings as constitu-
tional, the Court refused to adopt the petitioner's proposed
bright-line rule that would automatically invalidate eco-
42 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005). The
majority included Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kennedy. Id. at 470.
43 Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails),
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at Al.
44 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482-83.451 d. at 484. (noting that other factors justifying the validity of their
result, including extensive deliberation prior to the Plan's adoption and
statutory authorization for this Plan in Connecticut).46 Id. at 484.
47 1d. at 485; see, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
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nomic development as a public use. 48 Thus, the Kelo ma-
jority rejected the petitioner's contention that "eminent
domain for economic development impermissibly blurs the
boundary between public and private takings.",49 Again, the
Court deferred to its past jurisprudence and noted that it
"'cannot say ... public ownership is the sole method of
promoting the public purposes of . . . redevelopment
projects."' 50 The majority's decision focused solely on the
Plan's purpose and its attendant takings, not the mechanics
required to implement the Plan or the takings.
51
Essentially, the Court, through a five-person majori-
ty, openly sanctioned the ancillary private use of property
taken by eminent domain, if the public purpose behind the
taking is constitutional and if the property's development
occurs within the parameters of a redevelopment plan.
52
The Framers of the Constitution likely never intended emi-
nent domain as a mechanism to take private land for a pur-
ported (even incidental) public purpose and later allow
another private party to benefit directly from the taking.
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the
deprivation of private property without due process of law
or without just compensation. 53  This opinion militates
against the Framers' intent of the Fifth Amendment, specif-
48 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485; see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36 (noting
that economic redevelopment can be a valid public use).49 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485.
50 Id. at 486 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-34) (emphasis added).
51 See id. at 489 ("Once the question of... purpose has been decided,
the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the
need for a particular tract ... rests in the discretion of the legislative
branch.").
52 Id. at 486-87 (noting that the Court will not examine any hypothetical
case in which a condemning authority transfers land from one private
citizen to another for the purpose of increasing the property's produc-
tivity, even though they would substantiate the petitioner's bright-line
rule prohibiting economic development as a public use).
53 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1 (prohibiting deprivation of a person's
property without due process of law or just compensation).
83
et al.: Vol 4 No 1
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
4:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 84
ically the Takings Clause, and runs contrary to the idea that
eminent domain takings should benefit all citizens.
The remainder of Kelo's majority opinion continued
the litany of deference by reiterating that legislative deci-
sions on public use are paramount, and that the Court is an
improper forum to debate the wisdom of a taking or the
plan behind it.54 In sum, the Court's majority validated
NLDC's Plan, the takings, and the stated public purposes
through a form of rational-basis review.55 Not surprisingly,
Justice Stevens would be eager to distance himself from
such a broad pronouncement of power under the Takings
Clause, especially if he was a legislator.56
Compared to the majority opinion, Justice Kenne-
dy's concurrence and the dissenting opinions in Kelo are
more realistic.57 Justice Kennedy strongly criticized the
majority's deferential treatment of NLDC' s takings and the
stated public purposes behind them, calling them "inciden-
tal or pretextual. ' '58 Validating takings based on "incidental
or pretextual public benefits," he writes, is expressly for-
bidden by the Constitution.59 Accordingly, Justice Kenne-
dy determined that a proactive inquiry into an economic
development plan's public purpose is needed to discover
whether the benefits conferred on the private parties are
merely incidental, contrary to the usual standard of ration-
al-basis deference. 60 Justice Kennedy concurred with the
majority that a presumptive invalidity of public purpose for
54 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488-90.
55 Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("This deferential standard of
review echoes the rational-basis test used to review economic regula-
tion under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses...
56 See Greenhouse, supra note 43, at Al.
57 Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Kelo highlights his significance as
a "swing-vote" because he voted with the majority to sustain NLDC's
taking as constitutional but also filed a separate concurrence justifying
his decision.58 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
59 
Id.
60 Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
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economic development plans is unwarranted; however, his
opinion was sage enough to advocate against a standard
that could allow for widespread takings of private land
under pretextual or incidental public purposes. 6 1 Kenne-
dy's opinion demonstrated an apparent understanding that
legislative pronouncements on public uses often occur with
little public input or meaningful thought. 62
The Kelo decision yielded two strong dissenting
opinions by Justices O'Connor 63 and Thomas, 64 respective-
ly. First, the O'Connor dissent, joined by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, focused on the ma-
jority's essential obliteration of "any distinction between
private and public use" under the Fifth Amendment.
65
Essentially, Justice O'Connor determined that the majority
opinion allows "incidental public benefits" derived from
economic redevelopment to serve the same function as a
direct public use, contrary to the Fifth Amendment's public
use clause. 66  Specifically, Justice O'Connor noted that
Berman and Midkiff, which the majority relied on, involved
a taking that conferred a direct public benefit. 67 Since direct
public benefits resulted from those takings, returning the
taken property to private individuals was inconsequential.6 s
The Court correctly sustained the takings and their public
purposes in those direct benefit cases.69 With the Kelo
takings, the lack of a direct relationship between the public
purpose of NLDC's Plan and public benefit conferred con-
sternated the dissenting justices. As a property rights advo-
61 Id. at 493.
62 Id.
61 Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissenters were Justices
O'Connor, Thomas, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
65 Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).66 id.
67 Id. at 500.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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cate, this author joins Justice O'Connor's condemnation of
the majority's permissive posture of allowing an indirect
public purpose to serve the textual and direct public pur-
pose required by the Fifth Amendment for takings.
Justice Thomas's dissent complements Justice
O'Connor's dissent by addressing a strictly textual and
historical interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. 70  This
dissent used a detailed overview of the extensive judicial
history and precedents underlying takings cases and ex-
plained how the Court's prior takings jurisprudence has led
it to the current (and arguably incorrect) result in Kelo.71
Interestingly, both dissenting opinions noted that the eco-
nomically poor of society will shoulder the constant threat
of having their property taken and redistributed to more
affluent and politically astute persons for redevelopment
under a likely incidental or pretextual "public purpose."
72
In short, the Kelo dissenters highlighted the majori-
ty opinion's shortcomings and warned those who read Kelo
that the Court's most recent pronouncement on takings will
impact landowners in a way never contemplated by the
Fifth Amendment. The effect of Kelo is akin to the erosion
of a hillside that will eventually cause a landslide on unsus-
pecting landowners. This author agrees with the dissenting
justices in using eminent domain to obtain a direct public
70 See id. at 506, 511, 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the
public use restriction in the Fifth Amendment means that the taken
private property is actually employed for a direct public good instead of
some merely conceivable public benefit (e.g. increased taxes)). This
dissent advocates a return to the plain textual meaning of the Takings
Clause, which is evidenced by Justice Thomas's dedication to strictly
construing the text, in a manner similar to Justice Hugo Black. See id.
at 523.
71 Id. at 512-18.
72 Id. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 521-22 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (specifically noting Justice Thomas's reference to the 'dis-
crete and insular minorities"' of United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), that would be directly affected by the
majority's holding in Kelo).
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benefit and with Justice Kennedy insofar that a more in-
depth inquiry is needed for economic redevelopment plans
and their alleged direct public purposes under the Fifth
Amendment. Tennessee, like many other states, unders-
tood Kelo's potential impact on eminent domain and the
concerns of the dissenting justices. Under intense electoral
pressure, Tennessee changed its takings law to counteract
Kelo and its future implications.
Tennessee's Legislative Response to Kelo v. City of New
London
During the 2006 legislative session, the Tennessee
General Assembly enacted Public Chapter 863 to revise
Tennessee's eminent domain statutes. 73  In changing the
law, the General Assembly responded to constituents' de-
mands that Tennessee revise its antiquated eminent domain
law to prevent a Kelo-type scenario from occurring. 74 Pub-
lic Chapter 863 addressed several different areas, including
the legislative intent for eminent domain, the definition of
public purpose, and the revision of specific eminent domain
procedures. 7
5
The Tennessee General Assembly began its statuto-
ry revisions by declaring that eminent domain should "be
used sparingly" and that a narrow construction of the emi-
nent domain statutes was required to prevent any uninten-
73 See Scott Griswold, Property Rights vs. Public Use, TENN. B.J., Feb.
2007, at 14, 15.
74 For ease of reference, I will reference the Tennessee Code Annotated
section affected by Public Chapter 863 when discussing the changes to
Tennessee's eminent domain law.
75 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-101 (Supp. 2007) (stating the General
Assembly's intent on the appropriate use of eminent domain); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-17-102 (Supp. 2007) (defining both eminent domain
and public use for the purposes of eminent domain); See e.g., TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-17-903(c) (Supp. 2007) (amending the time period for
the "quick-take" procedure from five days to thirty days, among other
procedural changes enacted by Public Chapter 863).
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tional enlargement of the state's ability to take private land
for public purposes. 76 This statute is the General Assem-
bly's statement of legislative intent for eminent domain. In
an interview with State Senator Doug Jackson, he ex-
plained that the recent changes were a reactionary response
that attempted to balance the concerns of those who feared
that Kelo would occur in Tennessee, such as the Tennessee
Farm Bureau, and those fearing that the General Assem-
bly's response to Kelo would unduly narrow eminent do-
main, such as local governments. 77 Senator Jackson
estimated that Public Chapter 863 represents the final com-
promise between several dozen bills filed immediately after
Kelo and should effectively prevent any Kelo-type scena-
rios from occurring in Tennessee.
78
Next, Public Chapter 863 attempted to define both
eminent domain and what constitutes public use for emi-
nent domain purposes. 79 Interestingly, this aspect of Ten-
nessee's eminent domain law was notably absent for many
years. 80 The statute first defines eminent domain as "the
authority conferred upon the government ... to condemn
and take.., private property... so long as the property is
taken for a legitimate public use." 81 Public use is then
76 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-101 (Supp. 2007).
77 Telephone Interview with State Sen. Doug Jackson, representing the
2 5th Senatorial District and sponsor of S.B. 3296, the parent legislation
of Public Chapter 863 (Mar. 19, 2007).
78 id.
79 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102 (Supp. 2007); see also Griswold,
supra note 73, at 15-16.
80 See Griswold, supra note 73, at 15.
81 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(1) (Supp. 2007); see TENN. CONST.
art. I, § 21 ("[N]o man's particular ... property taken, or applied to
public use... without just compensation...."). Interestingly, Section
102 states that a legitimate public use must be "in accordance with the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, the
Constitution of Tennessee, Art. 1, §21, and the provisions of chapter
863 of the Public Acts of 2006," as codified in the Tennessee Code
Annotated. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(1) (Supp. 2007).
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defined broadly and negatively as follows: "[direct] private
use or benefit, or the indirect public benefits resulting from
private economic development and private commercial
enterprise, including increased tax revenue and increased
employment opportunity" are not public uses for eminent
domain. 82 Through this language, the General Assembly
responded directly to Kelo by defining public use for emi-
nent domain in terms of the Court's most recent pro-
nouncement of what is acceptable as a public purpose for
taking private land.83
Aside from the public use definition, the revisions
included exceptions that permitted takings for traditional
public purposes (e.g. roads and highways); common carri-
ers and other utilities; housing authorities or community
development agencies; and industrial parks.8 4  Another
revision in this statute provided that private property taken
pursuant to an urban renewal or redevelopment plan must
occur to eliminate a "blighted area." 85 "Blighted area" is
defined under Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-20-
201(a) as an "[area] (including slum areas) with buildings
or other improvements" that are detrimental to, inter alia,
the overall "welfare of the community" because of the
statutory reasons therein. 86 The statute also exempted
82 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (Supp. 2007).
83 See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
(defining acceptable public uses for eminent domain).
84 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2)(A)-(C), (E) (Supp. 2007).85 Id. at (2)(C).
86 Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp. 2007) (stating
that "[w]elfare of the community does not include solely a loss of
property value to surrounding properties... [or] the need for increased
tax revenues" as sufficient justifications to deem the property blighted),
with Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494, 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting
Justice O'Connor's concern of taking property so that government can
upgrade the property and get more revenue from it via taxes).
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farmland used in agricultural production from the definition
of blight.87
Despite the General Assembly's best efforts, only
judicial interpretation of this broad and vague standard of
public use will dictate its effectiveness for preventing Kelo-
type takings. 88 Litigious landowners can litigate the true
meaning of the broad and vague definition of blighted
area,89 or whether a government project causing a taking is
actually conferring a direct public benefit. 90 Adverse ef-
fects on poorer neighborhoods and less affluent property
owners are likely thanks to these recent changes in the law
because they are often subjected to redevelopment plans
similar to those in Kelo and Berman.
91
In addition to the obvious effects discussed above, a
concern exists that the recent changes still permit the very
mechanisms that caused Kelo: takings by economic redeve-
lopment agencies conferring only indirect public benefits.
92
The statute prohibits taking for private development that
has indirect public benefits as their public use justification;
however, takings by redevelopment agencies are still ac-
cepted by the revised statute. 93 These plans often include
private developers as the catalyst to fulfill the plan. This
issue causes consternation because a close reading of the
revised statute appears to leave open a possibility for
another Kelo type taking in Tennessee, despite the General
87 TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-105(2)(A) (Supp. 2007) (defining agricul-
ture and agricultural uses); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp.
2007).
88 See Griswold, supra note 73, at 17 (reaching the same prediction as
the author for these recent legislative changes).
89 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp. 2007).
90 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102 (Supp. 2007).
91 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505, 521-22 (O'Connor and Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting) (mirroring the same arguments of a disproportionate impact
on less affluent and prosperous people through the majority's opinion
in the case); Griswold, supra note 73, at 16-17.
92 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (Supp. 2007).
9' Id. at (2)(C).
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Assembly's efforts to "cure" the problems caused by Kelo
and rendering the new public use definition ineffective.
Another concern arises out of the statutory revi-
sions. Putting aside the issue of whether a taking confers a
direct public benefit, one of the public use exceptions states
that "private use that is merely incidental to a public use" is
a permissible public use, as long as the land condemned is
not "primarily .. . [for] the incidental private use."9 4 This
exception appears to impute an intent requirement into
takings law that was previously unknown (and likely never
intended) in eminent domain.
For example, suppose a city takes thirty acres of
land for a new park. This city is economically impove-
rished and often lacks tax revenues. When the city takes
the property through eminent domain, the city intends to
develop the park, as its stated public purpose for the taking.
Everyone knows, however, that the money will never be
there to fulfill the project. The land is held for several
years with no progress made towards the park (i.e. the pub-
lic purpose for the taking). Eventually, the county sells the
condemned property to a private company that later devel-
ops the land into a new car factory, which generates new
jobs and added tax revenues. 95 The park never materializ-
es, but the city has a new employer and revenue source.
The preceding example demonstrates that private
property can be taken for a (purported) public purpose and
later turned over to a private developer as an "incidental"
use because the primary purpose for taking the land initial-
94 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2)(D) (Supp. 2007).
95 Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-1003(a) (Supp. 2007) (stating
that when "land acquired by eminent domain" is subsequently disposed
of by a condemning authority "to another public or quasi-public entity
or to a private person, corporation, or other entity," fair market value
for the property or better must be received by the transferor), with GA.
CODE ANN. § 22-1-2(b) (Supp. 2007) (providing that no conversion of
property "for any use other than a public use" shall take place until
twenty years after the initial taking).
91
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ly was a permissible public use. The private use for the
property did not arise until several years later and is merely
incidental to changing times, economics, and political
priorities. Essentially, the exception could gut the newly
enacted public use definition because an intent requirement
is superimposed on the public use definition. A govern-
mental body can potentially take land intending it for a
public use, only to never have the means to fulfill the pur-
pose and later sell the property off to private individuals as
an "incidental" occurrence to the taking. The transfer
would fulfill the statute's literal requirements for public
use, but would circumvent the legislative intent behind
eminent domain. Thus, this process would render the pub-
lic use definition meaningless because the actual events
would run totally contrary to the statutory language. 9
6
Challenging takings based on this scenario would require a
showing of bad faith regarding the government's intent
behind the initial taking and subsequent property transfer to
a private individual (i.e. the proof would require that the
governmental body took private land by eminent domain
and then transferred it to another private party, knowing
that the taking's public purpose would never materialize at
the time of the original taking). 97
An example of how Public Chapter 863 revised
specific eminent domain procedures is evidenced by the
revision of the "quick-take" procedure for public agency
takings. Prior to 2006, a condemning authority in Tennes-
see, such as the Department of Transportation, could give a
96 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102 (Supp. 2007) (noting that these
takings of land for an intended public use, selling to a private party, and
then enjoying the indirect public benefits derived from the private
development run directly contrary to the language of indirect public
benefits caused by private developments and shall not be a public use
for eminent domain).9 7 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (noting that the
petitioner's failure to demonstrate intent on the part of the government
by concrete evidence proved fatal to their case).
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landowner only five days notice before being entitled to
physical possession of the property pursuant to its power of
condemnation. 98 The revised law now requires the con-
demning authority to give the landowner a thirty-day notice
before taking possession of the property. 99 Based on per-
sonal work experience, the thirty-day notice requirement
benefits landowners by giving them time to plan for the
imminent condemnation and devise an appropriate re-
sponse. The condemning authority also benefits because it
litigates dozens of other condemnation actions concurrently
that require an equal amount of attention. 100 Despite con-
tentions that this added time will only delay eminent do-
main litigation, practitioners on both sides will likely agree
that the marginal cost is outweighed by the added benefits
of the extra time in the interest of fairness and justice.
In closing, the recent changes to Tennessee's emi-
nent domain law will have far-reaching implications for
Tennessee practitioners. Aside from litigation over specific
procedural issues, such as how to correctly value the con-
demned property, broader issues dealing with a taking's
constitutionality will likely occur due to the formulation of
a more narrow and vague public use definition, including
98 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-803(b) (2005). The "quick-take" proce-
dure most often involves land acquisitions for highway right-of-ways;
however, this type of taking is one of the most common uses of emi-
nent domain in Tennessee.
99 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-903(c) (Supp. 2007). This statute applies
to situations in which the private landowners are not contesting con-
demnation and the private landowners contest either the condemnation
itself or the amount of just compensation due to them for the taking.
Note that Part 8 of the statute, dealing with the "quick-take" procedure
was moved to Part 9 of the Tennessee Code following the 2006 statuto-
0revisions.
The author has clerked for two summers for the Tennessee Attorney
General's Office in the Real Property Division and has handled con-
demnation litigation for the State of Tennessee.
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what constitutes "incidental private use" or a "blighted
area."
101
Tennessee's Sister States Follow the Kelo Revision
Movement
After the Court's decision in Kelo, states bordering
Tennessee have reformed their eminent domain laws in a
similar fashion. This section of this essay will briefly dis-
cuss the efforts of Kentucky, Georgia, and Alabama in
reforming eminent domain as a comparison of how Tennes-
see's sister states are counteracting Kelo. 10 2 This section
will compare each examined sister-state's definition of
public use, blight, legislative intent, and other notable in-
novations in their laws to Tennessee's eminent domain
revisions. 
103
Kentucky
Kentucky is the first sister state examined regarding
its post-Kelo eminent domain changes. During the 2006
legislative session, Kentucky revised its eminent domain
statute to specifically define public use and prohibit emi-
101 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (Supp. 2007) (defining ac-
ceptable public uses for eminent domain); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-
20 1(a) (Supp. 2007) (dealing with the definition of blight).
102 See generally National Conference of State Legislatures, 2006 State
Legislation,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/emindomainleg06.htm (last vi-
sited Sept. 18, 2007) (highlighting the recent efforts among various
states to change their respective eminent domain statutes in light of
Kelo).
103 See also Carol J. Miller & Stanley A. Leasure, Post-Kelo Determi-
nation of Public Use and Eminent Domain in Economic Development
Under Arkansas Law, 59 ARK. L. REv. 43, 43 (2006) (discussing
Arkansas's revisions to eminent domain after Kelo); Dale A. Whitman,
Eminent Domain Reform in Missouri: A Legislative Memoir, 71 MO. L.
REv. 721, 721 (2006) (discussing Missouri's statutory revisions after
Kelo).
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nent domain for economic development projects providing
only an incidental public benefit as the validating public
purpose. 10 4  Kentucky and Tennessee's eminent domain
statutes are similar, in that both statutes define acceptable
public uses justifying eminent domain and limit incidental
private uses of taken land to those that do not result in tak-
ing private land solely for incidental private use. 10 5 Ken-
tucky, like Tennessee, declared that the legislative intent
for eminent domain is that it should "be used sparingly"
and only for the benefit of all the citizens within the
state.106 One interesting point concerning Kentucky's re-
cent eminent domain revisions is the exemption for land
acquisitions financed by state or federal road funds. 07 The
constitutionality of taking land for a plainly public purpose,
such as a road, would not likely be questioned, but a few
situations exist in which takings for roads and highways
would cause a Kelo type problem for a condemning author-
ity. 10
8
Georgia
The next state examined is Georgia and its 2006
Landowner's Bill of Rights and Private Property Protection
Act.'0 9 Georgia, like Tennessee, enacted both specific
procedural changes for eminent domain takings and specif-
ic definitions for acceptable public uses justifying eminent
104 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
105 Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675(2) (LexisNexis Supp.
2007), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (Supp. 2007).
106 Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007),
with TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-101 (Supp. 2007).
107 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
108 One conceivable situation that could trigger this exemption in Ken-
tucky is when a highway project is funded but never completed, and the
property is used later for a private development.
9 See 2006 Ga. Laws, Ch. 444 (serving as Georgia's form of compre-
hensive statutory eminent domain reform).
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domain. 110 However, Georgia's statutory revisions differ
from Tennessee's in two respects. First, Tennessee's pub-
lic use definition is more straightforward than Georgia's
definition. Tennessee's definition for public use is con-
tained in one straightforward provision, whereas Georgia's
definition is scattered over several different code provi-
sions.111 In addition, Georgia included both private benefit
and indirect public benefit in the definition of economic
development and summarily stated that "[t]he public bene-
fit of economic development shall not constitute a public
use."'112 Tennessee took the opposite approach and clearly
stated what constitutes an acceptable public use for eminent
domain, albeit negatively, and notwithstanding excep-
tions. 113
Second, Georgia's definition of blight is more re-
strictive than Tennessee's because Georgia requires that
two or more of the statutorily enumerated conditions exist
before a property is termed "blighted" for eminent domain
purposes. 114 Tennessee has a more inclusive standard for
blight, where a property meeting just one of the require-
ments is determined blighted, including the overly broad
"welfare of the community" standard.115 Interestingly, both
states prohibited a finding of blight for eminent domain
purposes solely because a property causes the surrounding
property values to decline because of its aesthetic condi-
tion. 116 Arguably, both states have equally strong defini-
11Oid.
111 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(9)(A) (Supp. 2007), and GA.
CODE ANN. § 22-1-2 (Supp. 2007), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-
102(2) (Supp. 2007).
112 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(4), (9)(B) (Supp. 2007).
113 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (Supp. 2007).
114 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(1) (Supp. 2007) (noting the conditions for
findings of blight on the property being uninhabitable, abandoned,
environmentally hazardous, or conducive to ill health or disease).
115 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp. 2007).
116 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(1) (Supp. 2007), with TENN.
CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp. 2007).
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tions of blight and public use; however, the outcome of
litigation will determine their effectiveness.
Georgia, like Tennessee, takes a comparable posi-
tion on the legislative intent behind eminent domain be-
cause both states declare that eminent domain is solely for
public usages.1 17 Georgia's recent revisions included lan-
guage allowing a landowner to reclaim his property (i.e.
right of first refusal) or receive additional compensation if
the "property acquired through the power of eminent do-
main from an owner fails to be put to a public use within
five years." 118 Tennessee has a similar provision; however,
the procedure is quite complex. 
119
In sum, Georgia has enacted equally forceful emi-
nent domain revisions to curb Kelo's negative effects.
Tennessee could easily duplicate some of Georgia's inno-
vative revisions to eminent domain, such as defining blight
based on a specific condition/factor test.
Alabama
Alabama is the last of Tennessee's sister-states that
this paper examines regarding recent eminent domain
changes after Kelo. Alabama's reforms parallel Tennes-
see's revisions in defining public use and legislative intent
117 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-2(a) (Supp. 2007) ("[N]either this
state nor any political subdivision... shall use eminent domain unless
it is for public use.... ."), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-101 (Supp.
2006).
118 See GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-2(c)(1) (Supp. 2007). Specifically, the
property is considered put to a public use when a "substantial good
faith effort has been expended.., to put the property to public use,"
regardless of whether the project is completed. While a very worth-
while provision for landowners, the provision is flexible and could
prove to be heavily litigated.
9 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-1003 (Supp. 2007) (dealing with the
disposal of land acquired by eminent domain); TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-
2-112 (2005) (dealing with the disposal of surplus interests in real
property held by the state).
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governing eminent domain. 12  First, Alabama's statutory
revisions prohibited the use of "eminent domain to transfer
private property for 'purposes of private retail, office,
commercial, industrial, or residential development."' 121
The revisions further prohibited local condemning authori-
ties from using eminent domain to increase tax revenues or
from transferring taken private property to anyone except
purely governmental entities. 122 Thus, Alabama's legisla-
tive intent, though not explicitly defined, appears to be that
eminent domain is a tool to be used strictly for the public
welfare. Both Tennessee and Alabama have public use
definitions that are comparable in their effect; however,
Alabama used more explicit language to define an accepta-
ble public use under eminent domain. 
123
In addition, Alabama's statutory revisions, like
Tennessee's, permit the taking and transferring of private
property that is termed blighted, under statutory formula-
tions, to private entities under a redevelopment plan.
124
Alabama's revisions also include a buyback provision for
landowners who lose their property via eminent domain if
the property never materializes into a public use. 125 This
120 See Anastasia C. Sheffier-Wood, Where Do We Go from Here?
States Revise Eminent Domain Legislation in Response to Kelo, 79
TEMP. L. REv. 617, 631-32 (2006) (evaluating Alabama's changes to
its eminent domain laws). Compare ALA. CODE §§ 18-1B-1-2 (Lexis-
Nexis 2006), with TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-17-101-102 (Supp. 2006)
(determining legislative purpose and defining public use for eminent
domain).
121 See Sheffler-Wood, supra note 120, at 631.
122 id.
123 Compare ALA. CODE § 18-1B-2 (LexisNexis 2007), with TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-17-102 (Supp. 2007).124 See ALA. CODE § 24-2-2(c) (LexisNexis 2007). Compare ALA.
CODE § 18-IB-2 (LexisNexis 2007), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-
102 (Supp. 2007).
125 Compare ALA. CODE § 18-1B-2(b) (LexisNexis 2007) (stating that
the right of first refusal in the buyback provision goes to the landowner
whom the condemning authority acquired the property from via emi-
nent domain), with GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-2(c)(1) (Supp. 2007) (stat-
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provision is similar to Georgia's right of first refusal and
Tennessee's buyback provisions; however, Alabama does
not appear have a time limitation on this buyback provi-
sion. 12
6
In sum, Alabama, like Tennessee, appears to have
revised its eminent domain law to prevent a Kelo-type
situation from occurring, but testing the effectiveness of the
revisions will occur only through future eminent domain
litigation, as is the case in every other state currently revis-
ing its eminent domain statutes.
Conclusion
Aside from the critical look at Kelo and the compar-
ison of eminent domain revisions between Tennessee and
its sister states, the recent revisions to Tennessee's eminent
domain law yield several conclusions. First, adding specif-
ic definitions for public use, blight, and eminent domain
afford Tennessee landowners some certainty for under-
standing what purposes the government can take their land
under the power of eminent domain. Until recently, local
governments could determine what constituted a valid
public purpose for taking land under eminent domain sua
sponte.127 The addition of a quasi-specific public use defi-
nition should aid both condemning authorities and lan-
downers in determining when eminent domain takings are
appropriate and prevent the possibility of another Kelo
occurrence. The criticism is that the public use definition is
still sufficiently vague and unascertainable, thereby afford-
ing the government flexibility in taking property in many
ing that the former landowner can apply to condemning authority to
regain property taken by eminent domain if property is not put to a
public use within five years of its taking).
6 ALA. CODE § 18-1B-2(b) (LexisNexis 2007).
127 See Griswold, supra note 73, at 16 (noting that prior to the 2006
revisions, "counties could use eminent domain 'for any county pur-
pose' deemed appropriate).
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cases. This flexibility in takings could be shown when an
intended public use eventually yields to an "incidental"
private use after the taking or when an economic redeve-
lopment plan uses eminent domain and private develop-
ment to achieve some indirect public use essentially
sanctioned by the statute.
Second, the revision of the "quick-take" procedure
affords a greater degree of fairness to landowners and con-
demning authorities alike. By increasing the notice of a
proposed taking to thirty days, both sides have a better
opportunity to evaluate the facts and handle the dispute in a
mutually beneficial manner. This broadened time frame
will hopefully alleviate litigation and encourage settlements
of takings cases outside of court. 128
Finally, the eminent domain revisions are far from
complete. Changes will likely be forthcoming to the emi-
nent domain laws in the future, as time passes and circums-
tances change with litigation. Overall, the recent changes
enacted by Tennessee to its eminent domain law in 2006
have likely offset any potential adverse effect created by
the Kelo decision, ifjust by the simple fact that the changes
to the law have put the electorate on notice that eminent
domain is regarded for strictly public purposes.
The recent changes to our eminent domain law
would help protect our hypothetical grandmother, intro-
duced at the beginning of this paper, and prevent her land
from becoming another Kelo type taking. These changes
represent progress towards a balance between the govern-
ment's need and right to take private land for public use
and a landowner's right to enjoy property without the threat
of unwarranted government seizure.
128 In this author's experience with eminent domain cases, many con-
dermnation actions are eventually settled out of court, but this increase
notice period of thirty days will hopefully facilitate a greater number of
settlements. Many landowners, when confronted with losing their
property, often become upset easily or become irrational if forced into a
quick decision on compensation or other matters related to the taking.
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OPINION PIECE
FACT-BASED DEATH PENALTY RESEARCH
Lewis L. Laska*
"Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our
wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions,
they cannot alter the state offacts and evidence: nor is the
law less stable than the fact" '
I. What is Fact-Based Death Penalty Research?
The goal of fact-based death penalty research is,
simply put, to capture and document as many facts sur-
rounding legal executions as possible, organize them in a
clear and logical manner, and present them without bias,
cant, or sentiment. This compilation of facts is then made
available for an analysis of whether patterns appear sug-
gesting which facts were and possibly still remain the lead-
* Member of the Nashville Bar; Professor of Business Law, College of
Business, Tennessee State University; B.S., Belmont College, 1969;
J.D., Vanderbilt Law School, 1973; M.B.A., University of Tennessee at
Nashville, 1973; Ph.D., George Peabody College, 1978.
1 John Adams, Defense of the British Soldiers in the Boston Massacre
Trials (Dec. 3, 1770). John Adams' famous defense of the soldiers
charged in the Boston Massacre resulted in the acquittal of the officer
in charge. 3 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, FROM THE DISCOVERY OF THE CONTINENT 390 (D. Appleton
and Co. 1896) (1882). It could not be shown that the officer, rather
than some other person, had told the soldiers to fire. Id. The jury
returned manslaughter convictions on two of the eight soldiers who
fired on the rabble. Id. at 391. The jury "acquitted the other six;
choosing that five guilty should escape rather than one innocent be
convicted." Id.
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ing factors influencing legal death. The focus of fact-based
research is clear and orderly facts. Indeed, publications
that grow out of fact-based death penalty research docu-
ment executions in chronological order, and each entry
includes the executed person's name, age, gender, race, a
detailed account in narrative form of the crime for which
the accused was sentenced to death, and information on the
place and method of execution. Regardless of the legal
issue, the first place to begin death penalty research is with
a list of those known to have suffered irrevocable punish-
ment.
II. The History of Fact-Based Death Penalty Re-
search
Like many other forms of social science research,
fact-based death penalty research had an unlikely origin, an
Alabama gentleman by the name of M. Watt Espy. The
story is well known. In 1970, Espy, an unalterable aboli-
tionist of the death penalty, undertook the solitary task of
attempting to capture information about all legal executions
in the United States. By speaking to county clerks and
librarians and referencing newspapers, official sources, and
even "true crime" magazines, 2 Espy captured information
regarding well over 15,000 executions that were carried out
in the United States from 1608 to 2002. 3
2 The best quality "true crime" magazines were published by Bemarr
McFadden in the 1920s and 1930s. Bemarr McFadden (1868-1955),
"The Father of Physical Culture," http://www.bemarrmacfadden.com/
(follow "A Publishing Empire") (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). These
included, among others, True Detective and Master Detective. Id.
3 M. Watt Espy & John Ortiz Smykla, Executions in the United States,
1608-2002: The Espy File, app. B (Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research 2004) available at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/08451.xml (last
visited Feb. 16, 2008); see also M. Watt Espy, American Gothic, in A
104
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The famous Espy inventory has spawned several
books addressing America's death penalty including the
works of Daniel Allen Hearn. Hearn steadfastly refuses to
state publicly his view of capital punishment. Rather, he is
a death penalty historian, patiently gathering facts and
declining to offer premature conclusions. Hearn's first
book was entitled Legal Executions in New York State: A
Comprehensive Reference, 1639-1963 and appeared in
1997. 4 Hearn has since published two more books in the
same fact-based model, Legal Executions in New Jersey: A
Comprehensive Registry, 1691-19635 and Legal Executions
in New England: A Comprehensive Reference, 1623-1960.6
One truth, largely unknown by those who acknowl-
edge the value of the Espy list, is that numerous additions
were made to the list through the assistance of Hearn.7 In
particular, Hearn captured and contributed additional facts
from newspaper accounts-most notably The New York
Herald--"true crime" magazines, and local government
records. 8 Specifically, Hearn read microfilm of Memphis
newspapers dating from 1866 to 1876 in order to capture
information about executions in Tennessee, Mississippi,
and Arkansas. 9 Even now, Hearn continues to expand on
the Espy list, and he plans to publish an updated list of
legal executions in the United States since 1866.10 Hearn
urges caution in using unrefined data in the Espy list be-
PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME: AMERICANS SPEAK OUT AGAINST
THE DEATH PENALTY, 47-53 (Ian Gray & Moria Stanley eds., 1989).
4 DANIEL ALLEN HEARN, LEGAL EXECUTIONS IN NEW YORK STATE: A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE, 1639-1963 (1997).
'DANIEL ALLEN HEARN, LEGAL EXECUTIONS IN NEW JERSEY: A COM-
PREHENSIVE REGISTRY, 1691-1963 (2005).
6 DANIEL ALLEN HEARN, LEGAL EXECUTIONS IN NEW ENGLAND: A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE, 1623-1960 (1999).
7 Interview with Daniel Allen Heam, in Nashville, Tenn. (Oct. 12,
2007).
8Id.
9 Id.
1° Id.
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cause it contains numerous omissions.11 For example, the
Espy list contains approximately 312 entries for Mary-
land. 12  Hearn, presently writing a comprehensive refer-
ence on Maryland's executions, has located over 755.
III. What Is the Value of Fact-Based Death Penalty
Research?
Death penalty commentators often speak about the
random nature of the death penalty. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court struck down the death penalty after
determining that Georgia's death penalty statute afforded
sentencing jurors unguided discretion which resulted in the
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. 14
It was only after passing legislative standards, in the form
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances aimed at eli-
minating unbridled discretion, that states were again al-
lowed to sentence defendants to death. 15
Fact-based death penalty research questions the
theory that the death penalty is or has ever been imposed
randomly; it suggests, rather, that there may be untradition-
al macro-patterns to explain legal death that simply cannot
be seen without a more complete nation-wide compilation
of executions. Fact-based death penalty research asks, for
example, "What patterns of jury conduct will be revealed if
all executions in the United States are presented for exami-
nation by fair-minded people?" These patterns are akin, for
11 Id.
12 See M. Watt Espy & John Ortiz Srykla, Executions in the United
States, 1608-2002: The Espy File, app. B (Inter-University Consortium
for Political and Social Research 2004) available at
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/0845 1.xml (last
visited Feb. 16, 2008).
13 Interview with Daniel Allen Hearn, in Nashville, Tenn. (Oct. 12,
2007).
14 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 294-95 (1972).
15 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976).
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example, to the discovery of large-scale pre-Columbian
civilizations in South America-almost impossible to see
close up, but evident from the air?
1 6
Fact-based death penalty research has the potential
to address more narrow issues of law as well. It might, for
example, offer insights into one of the most intractable
injustices encountered during death penalty trials, misiden-
tification based on eyewitness testimony. 17 A basic rule of
evidence holds that eyewitness testimony holds the greatest
reliability. However, in the United States between 1989
and 2003, at least 219 defendants were exonerated in part
on the basis of at least one eyewitness misidentification. 18
Could fact-based death penalty research reveal the fact
patterns within which misidentification is most likely to
occur?
IV. What Are the Bounds of Fact-Based Death Pe-
nalty Research?
Because Hearn steadfastly refuses to commit the
bounds of his research to any fixed medium, they must be
drawn from him in personal conversations. This is not a
pleasant experience. Hearn, age fifty, has become the alter
ego of M. Watt Espy in many ways: stubborn, sometimes
helpful, always critical, and downright irascible. Without
16 See CHARLES C. MANN, 1491: NEW REVELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS
BEFORE COLUMBUS 3-27 (2005).
17 See generally Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriag-
es of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21
(1987) (discussing the modem debate regarding innocent persons
convicted in capital cases). However, various authors have addressed
the issue of factual innocence over the past century. See generally
EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE AC-
TUAL ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932); JUDGE JEROME FRANK &
BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957); EDWARD D. RADIN, THE INNO-
CENTS (1964).
18 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989
Through 2003, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 523, 542 (2005).
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the leavening influence of a wife and children, Hearn prac-
tices his science largely alone. Although sometimes dis-
tracted by a poker game with friends, most of his free time
is spent capturing information about legal executions in the
United States. Nevertheless, here are the bounds of fact-
based death penalty research, as this author understands
them.
It seems self-evident that only legal executions are
contemplated within the ambit of fact-based death penalty
research-discussions of extra-legal killings are not in-
cluded. Extra-legal killings include but are not limited to
the following: those who died by their own hand while
awaiting execution, those who died while attempting to
escape, those who were murdered while incarcerated, or
any execution that was not directly administered by the
state. These deaths were not the result of legal executions.
In the same vein, the fact-based death penalty re-
searcher should always document the fact of the legal ex-
ecution. Two sources demonstrate that this is, somewhat
surprisingly, a common omission; the authors of both of the
following books fail to confirm whether certain people
sentenced to death were actually executed. The first
source, which documents Tennessee executions, is a nota-
ble county history series published in the nineteenth cen-
tury known as Goodspeeds.19 Goodspeeds, for example,
reported "Nelson, a slave of James Elliott, was indicted for
the murder of David Sellers on November 11, 1845. The
case resulted in a sentence of death on June 8, 1846."2 °
This statement is correct but misleading. Nelson's convic-
tion was overturned by the Tennessee Supreme Court in an
1 9 HISTORY OF TENNESSEE FROM THE EARLIEST TIME TO THE PRESENT:
SKETCH OF HENDERSON, CHESTER, MCNAIRY, DECATUR, AND HARDIN
COUNTIES 834 (The Southern Historical Press 1978) (1887) available
at http://www.mytennesseegenealogy.com/tn-County/hm.htin (last
visited Feb. 16, 2008).20Id. at 834.
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important decision setting out the rules of admissibility of
dying declarations.
21
The second source is a book written by Dr. and Mrs.
Phillip Crane, a physician and his wife, who used vacation
time to travel by car to each jail in Tennessee's ninety-five
counties taking pictures of the jails. 22 Included in the pic-
ture book were the names of people executed in that county
or sent to Nashville to be executed.23 The Cranes reported
the executions of Eve Martin in Hawkins County in 182024
and Green Turner in Giles County in 1871.25 Neither was
executed. Interestingly, Eve Martin was actually murdered
by two men, Robert Delap and Mitchell Marcum, neither of
whom the Cranes mention. 26 Turner's death sentence was
reduced to a twenty-one-year prison sentence.
27
Confirming that an execution actually occurred is a
difficult task that requires a researcher to exhaust a number
of sources; all available sources must be used to ferret out
facts. Most importantly, every effort must be made to lo-
cate state supreme court opinions. Failure to make a good
faith effort to locate all state supreme court opinions is
inexcusable. This includes those affirming a conviction, as
well as those reversing a conviction. Surprisingly, these
opinions often go unaddressed. Quite often, this is because
researchers assume these opinions have all been published.
21 Nelson v. State, 26 Tenn. 542, 543-44 (1847).
22 SOPHIE CRANE & PAUL CRANE, TENNESSEE'S TROUBLED ROOTS
passim (1979) (summarizing Tennessee county facilities for incarcera-
tion).
23 Id.
241d. at 41.
251Id. at31.
26 State v. Delap, 7 Tenn. 90 (1823) (affirning Robert Delap's convic-
tion for murder); KNOXVILLE REG. June 19, 1821, at 3 (containing the
confession of Mitchell Marcum).
27 Turner v. State, 50 Tenn. 452 (1871); Journal of the H.R., 39th Gen.
Ass., 0 Sess., app. Thl. Showing Name and Number of Convicts, at 21
(Tenn. 1875) ("282 Green Turner col Giles Circuit Horse-stealing
October21, 1872 21 years").
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On the contrary, many state supreme court opinions
were handwritten. After all, many courts did not begin
issuing typewritten opinions until the early twentieth cen-
tury. Consequently, these opinions often prove very diffi-
cult to read. However, even the most diligent researcher
may encounter an empty vessel. For at least sixty-three
men condemned to death, the Tennessee Supreme Court,
for example, issued written opinions, but these opinions
cannot be located.28  Startlingly, some of these "missing"
opinions were issued as late as the 1940s and 1950s.
2 9
If an appeal exists but no written opinion, published
or otherwise, can be located or if the supreme court opinion
contains no recitation of facts, as many do not, the trial
court and appellate court opinions must be consulted. In
addition to these court opinions, a death penalty researcher
should examine court records. Hearn suggests the follow-
ing research protocol for determining whether an execution
actually occurred: Because many rural counties had no
newspapers until the late nineteenth century, a diligent
researcher must consult the minutes of the local county
court to find entries where that body appropriated money to
build a scaffold for the execution and to pay the sheriff to
actually hang the accused. 30 Finally, fact-based death pe-
nalty research may also encompass short accounts known
as "confessions," 31 commutation records, newspaper ac-
counts, and even "true crime" magazines.
28 See Lewis L. Laska, Missing and "Mystery" Supreme Court Opi-
nions, 5 NASHVILLE B.J., June 2005, at 20-21. Even when a newspaper
reports the court announced its decision on a certain day, many deci-
sions from East Tennessee, especially from 1883-1903, cannot be
located. Id. The fact that these opinions are "missing" is a discourag-
ing aspect of fact-based death penalty research in Tennessee.2 9 Id
30 Interview with Daniel Allen Heam, in Nashville, Tenn. (Oct. 12,
2007).
31 During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a new form of popu-
lar literature arose, namely, the "confession" of a murderer. These
pamphlets, prepared with the assistance of the condemned, recounted
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Until the latter part of the twentieth century, most
executions were carried out within a year of the crime.
Hence, newspaper articles from that period are particularly
helpful because they often include an account of the execu-
tion as well as the crime. In fact, one of the first national
compilations of executions in the United States was the
Chicago Tribune's Year Book, which was published for
several decades. 32 "True crime" magazines may also be
considered a useful source because many of the articles
were written by the law enforcement officers who worked
on the cases and therefore contain photos and details drawn
from actual records that no longer exist. 33 Scholarly dis-
cussions of specific cases, however, should be used for
their factual content, rather than any argumentative material
therein. 
34
the crime details. See THOMAS M. McDADE, ANNALS OF MURDER, A
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS ON AMERICAN MURDERS
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 1900 (1961) (discussing the genre and
describing 1,126 books and pamphlets); see also, Patterson Smith,
Thomas McDade and the Annals of Murder, AB BOOKMANS' WEEKLY,
Apr. 22, 1996, available at www.patterson-smith.com/mcdadeArt.htm
(discussing the book as a "reference work of towering importance").
32 It should be noted, however, that the Chicago Tribune inventories are
strikingly incomplete: Death penalty researchers, including Espy and
Heam, have discovered hundreds of legal executions that were not
included in The Chicago Tribune's Year Book. Interview with Daniel
Allen Heam, in Nashville, Tenn. (Oct. 12, 2007). Moreover, many of
the people shown as executed were actually suicides, lynchings, phan-
tom cases, or reprieves at the last minute. Id.
33 See generally Bemarr McFadden (1868-1955), "The Father of Physi-
cal Culture," http://www.bemarrmacfadden.com/ (follow "A Publish-
ing Empire") (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
34This author has found only three books devoted to scholarly discus-
sions of specific Tennessee cases. See generally ETHELRED W. CROZI-
ER, THE WHITE-CAPS: A HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION IN SEVIER
COUNTY 118-132 (1899) (describing the killing of Laura and William
Whaley on December 28, 1896 and the execution of Catlett Tipton and
Pleas Wynn on July 5, 1899); THURMAN SENSING, CHAMP FERGUSON:
CONFEDERATE GUERILLA (1942) (describing the killings Ferguson
committed during the Civil War as proven at his trial in 1865); Do-
111
et al.: Vol 4 No 1
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
4:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 112
Finally, fact-based researchers are scientists, not
storytellers. Language used must be clear and without
viewpoint. For example, a murder is a killing or a shoot-
ing, not a slaughter. Perpetrators are not slashers, brutes, or
bloodthirsty maniacs. Police are law enforcement officers,
not conniving men protected by a thin veneer of law. Men-
tal status must be described in the most neutral language
possible. Perpetrators are not moral degenerates or imbe-
ciles, but they may be mentally ill, suffering from schi-
zophrenia, or mentally retarded. Likewise, cases must be
discussed by placing facts first and law second, if at all; the
law changes but facts do not.
35
V. Conclusion
Replacing death penalty story-telling with fact-
based research should be a concern of all fair-minded
people researching the death penalty in the United States.
Again, the goal is to capture as many facts as possible with-
in the bounds of fact-based death penalty research, as out-
lined, and present them clearly, without bias, cant, or
sentiment. In the end, the best story-telling is simply this:
Provide the facts that tell the truth. Facts are truly stubborn
things.
NALD E. SPURLOCK, THE BRASSELL HANGINGS OF PUTNAM COUNTY,
TENNESSEE (1981) (describing the killings of brothers Russell Allison
and John Allison and the execution of brothers Joseph Lewis Brassell
and George Andrew "Teek" Brassell in 1878).
35 Many perpetrators would not forfeit their lives today under "evolving
standards of decency." See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 55 1,
575 (2005) (holding that execution of people under the age of eighteen
is barred by the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
321 (2002) (holding that the execution of the mentally retarded is
barred by the Eighth Amendment); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
603 (1977) (holding that execution for the crime of rape is barred by
the Eighth Amendment).
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NOTE
STRIPPED BARE: STUDENTS' FOURTH AMEND-
MENT RIGHTS, SCHOOL SEARCHES, AND THE
REASONABLENESS STANDARD
Erin P. Davenport
I. Introduction
In Beard v. Whitmore Lake School District,' the
Sixth Circuit examined whether the law governing searches
of students, specifically strip searches, was clearly estab-
lished and deprived school officials of qualified immunity.
2
The Sixth Circuit first evaluated the strip search's constitu-
tionality under the Fourth Amendment. 3 Then, the Sixth
Circuit addressed whether qualified immunity protected
school officials. 4 Beard demonstrates that students' Fourth
Amendment rights receive less protection than teachers'
liability and could result in students shedding "their consti-
tutional rights at the school house gate." 5 With violence
and drug use on the rise in schools, courts consider stu-
dents' constitutional rights less important than the school's
safety and security. 6 Beard held that the strip search's
scope was unconstitutional because the students' privacy
expectations, the search's intrusive nature, and "the severi-
ty of the school system's needs" favored the students-not
' 402 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2005).
2 Id. at 601.
3 Id. at 603.
4 Id. at 606.
5 Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(mem.) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
6 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)
(internal citations omitted); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339
(1985) (internal citations omitted).
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the school. 7 Nonetheless, the teachers received qualified
immunity because the law was not clearly established. 8
This synopsis will show how courts have ap-
proached the constitutional issues surrounding school
searches and how students' rights have decreased over time
under the reasonableness standard and qualified immunity.
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in New Jersey v.
T.L.O.,9 schools' used various approaches to school
searches.' 0 After T.L.O., courts began to limit students'
Fourth An'endment rights. Today, schools search for
drugs, weapons, and evidence of drug use, and according to
the courts, these searches do not violate students' rights."l
Even if the courts consider some searches unreasonable,
qualified immunity protects teachers from liability because
the law surrounding these searches often is not clearly
established. Thus, school officials can act with impunity
because courts will likely perceive the search as reasonable
or grant school officials qualified immunity for their ac-
tions. If this pattern continues, students will retain no con-
stitutional rights within school walls, and this deprivation
of Fourth Amendment rights could extend beyond school
walls into everyday citizens' lives.
II. Back in the Day... The History of School
Searches and Students' Fourth Amendment Rights
Before 1985, courts in every jurisdiction ap-
proached students' Fourth Amendment rights differently. 12
The approaches offered four different levels of protection:
7 Beard, 402 F.3d at 604 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65).
8 Id. at 601.
9 469 U.S. at 325-26 (holding that the Fourth Amendment, excluding
the warrant requirement, applied to schools).
1o See id. at 340.
11 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346-48.
12 Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 52 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (mem.)
(internal citation omitted).
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the Fourth Amendment did not apply; the Fourth Amend-
ment applied, but the Exclusionary Rule did not; the Fourth
Amendment did apply, but in loco parentis used the rea-
sonableness standard to evaluate the search; or the Fourth
Amendment fully applied. 13 Although the courts varied on
students' Fourth Amendment rights, the Seventh Circuit
declared that nude searches of children "exceeded the
'bounds of reason' by two and a half country miles."
14
Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit adopted a balancing test,
which weighed "the [F]ourth [A]mendment rights of indi-
vidual students with the interests of the state and the school
officials in the maintenance of a proper educational envi-
ronment to educate today's youth."
15
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided a watershed
case, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 16 which created the "special
needs" doctrine for school searches. 17 The special needs
doctrine allowed for warrantless searches when "a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests
that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amend-
ment standard of reasonableness that stops short of proba-
ble cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a
standard."' 8 If the search fulfilled the two-part test, then it
met the reasonableness standard. 19 The search had to be
"justified at its inception" and "reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place." 20 The Supreme Court did not decide if "indi-
vidualized suspicion [was] an essential element of the rea-
sonableness standard" because the Fourth Amendment did
13Id. (internal citations omitted).
14 Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
15 Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1984).
16 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
17 Id. at 351 (Blackman, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
18 Id. at 341 (majority opinion).
191d.
20 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
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not list it as a requirement. 2 1 The Supreme Court believed
that school officials could easily apply a reasonableness
standard.22 The dissent, however, warned that this standard
would cause "greater uncertainty among teachers and ad-
ministrators.
23
The courts applied the two-part test to determine the
constitutionality of searches, but some courts clarified the
Supreme Court's test. In one case, the court held that a
student's conduct must create "a reasonable suspicion that a
specific rule or law has been violated and that a search
could reasonably be expected to produce evidence of that
violation. 24 Without reasonable suspicion of a violation,
the court cannot deem a search reasonable. 25
The courts also considered the search's reasonable-
ness under a "totality of the circumstances" analysis. 26 If a
search occurred because of a student's tip, the courts look
at the totality of the circumstances to determine if school
officials need to investigate further before conducting a
search.27 The totality of the circumstances applied to strip
searches because factors, like "age and sex of the student
and the nature of the infraction," determined if a search's
scope was reasonable. 28  Small sums of money did not
warrant a strip search, and courts considered these searches
21 Id. at 342 n.8 (internal citations omitted).
22 See id. at 343.
23 Id. at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
24 Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(mem.); see T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (footnote omitted).
25 See Cales, 635 F. Supp. at 457.
26 Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 888 (6th Cir.
1991) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (holding that
an informant's tip needs to be evaluated under a totality of the circums-
tances inquiry)).
27 See id. at 888-89.
28 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (footnote omitted).
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as unreasonable. 29 Without individualized suspicion, strip
searches lacked justification unless a "legitimate safety
concern" existed, and officials "must be investigating alle-
gations of violations of the law or school rules . . . 30
Additionally, these searches needed to be "minimally intru-
sive."
31
Courts attempted to limit the use of suspicion-less
searches if the students were not athletes. 32 Because ath-
letes chose to participate in school athletics, they should
"expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, in-
cluding privacy." 33 Physical education students, however,
"[do not] willingly subject themselves to this degree of
intrusion." 34 Additionally, a suspicion-less search will not
be considered reasonable in lieu of a possible "suspicion-
based search" because the government's needs "will never
be strong enough to outweigh" an individual's privacy
interests. 35 If school officials request the police officers'
presence, or the police officers work at the school, then the
reasonable suspicion standard applies. 36  Otherwise, they
must show probable cause. 37
29 See Oliver ex rel. Hines v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1218 (N.D.
Ind. 1995) (mern) (referring to the argument in Doe v. Renfrow that a
strip search for $4.50 is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
30 Konop ex rel. Konop v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1201
(D.S.D. 1998) (meni). But see Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (holding that student athletes were subject to
suspicion-less drug testing because they had a "decreased expectation
of privacy," the search was relatively unobtrusive, and the severity of
drug use in schools was a serious concern).
Konop, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
32 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663; Bell v. Marseille Elementary Sch.,
160 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887-88 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (mem.).
33 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (internal citations omitted).34 Bell, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 888.35 Id. at n.5 (quoting Willis v. Alderson Cnty. Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d
415,421 (7th Cir. 1998)).
36 Reynolds v. City of Anchorage, 379 F.3d 358, 372 (6th Cir. 2004)
(Moore, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).37 d. at 372-73.
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III. Qualified Immunity: School Officials' "In Case
of Unreasonable Search-Break Glass" Defense
A school official may claim qualified immunity if
courts deem the search unreasonable. Qualified immunity
"is an affirmative defense," and as state officials, school
officials can invoke it.38 Before the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,39 this immunity had objective
and subjective elements. 40 The Supreme Court, however,
eliminated the subjective element because the "judicial
inquiry" could disrupt "effective government.' 1 Because
qualified immunity is a question of law, courts must deter-
mine if qualified immunity protects the official.42
Qualified immunity requires an examination of "the
objective reasonableness of an official's conduct." 43 If the
courts think, "the law was clearly established," then the
official loses the immunity because a "public official
should know the law governing his conduct." 44 To deter-
mine whether a right is clearly established, courts examine
Supreme Court decisions; its own decisions, as well as
other decisions in its circuit; and other circuits' decisions.
45
Most cases turn on whether a right is clearly estab-
lished, but "a constitutional or statutory violation" must
occur. 46 Thus, courts must look at the situation and deter-
mine whether "the [official's] conduct violated a constitu-
38 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980)).
39 d. at 800.40 Id. at 815.
41 Id. at 817 (footnotes omitted).
42 See McBride v. Village of Michiana, 100 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir.
1996) (internal citations omitted).
43 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (footnote omitted).
44 Id. at 818-19 (footnote omitted).
45 See McBride, 100 F.3d at 460.
46 Saylor v. Bd. of Educ. of Harlan County, 118 F.3d 507, 512 (6th Cir.
1997) (internal citations omitted).
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tional right[.]" 47 If the official violated a right, then the
48
court considers whether that right was clearly established.
A right is clearly established if "a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.",
49
Even if courts have not previously addressed the exact
conduct, an official may lose qualified immunity if "in the
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [is] apparent., 50
Thus, "officials can still be on notice that their conduct
violates established law even in novel factual circums-
tances. 51
Finally, courts must examine the official's actions
for objective unreasonableness, which can be determined
"from direct holdings, from specific examples described as
prohibited, or from the general reasoning that a court em-
ploys., 52 This evaluation "requires a careful balancing of.
. the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the
countervailing governmental interests at stake." 53  Once
these criteria are met, the official loses qualified immunity
and may be liable for the unconstitutional conduct.
IV. The Beard Strip Search
Beard began with a strip search for stolen money
during a gym class. 54 The acting principal called the police
47 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (internal citations omit-
ted).
48 See id.
49 Id. at 202 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)).
0 Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 901 (6th Cir.
2004) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).
51 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
52 Champion, 380 F.3d at 902 (quoting Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843,848 (6th Cir. 2003)).
53 Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dep't, 389 F.3d 167, 173-74 (6th
Cir. 2004) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).54 Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.
2005).
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and asked three teachers for assistance. 55  The teachers
separated the students and searched their backpacks. 56
During the search, a male teacher made the boys remove
their shirts, lower their pants, and lower their underwear. 57
To avoid gender discrimination, the girls endured a strip
search, which required them to lift their shirts and lower
their pants. 58 The teachers did not touch the students, and
the search yielded no stolen money. 59
The students sued the school, and the school filed a
motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immuni-
ty.60 The district court denied the motion on the basis that
the law involving strip searches for missing money was
clearly established. 61 The defendants appealed to the Sixth
Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision. 62 The
Sixth Circuit held that "the law did not clearly establish that
the searches were unconstitutional under these circums-
tances."
63
In this case, the court addressed the issue of whether
the law clearly establishes that suspicion-less strip searches
of students are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amend-
ment. This case demonstrates that school officials have
protection from liability even in an unconstitutional school
search. Therefore, students lack constitutional protections
from a search under the reasonableness standard. The Su-
preme Court's claim that students "do not shed their consti-
55 id.
56 Id.
57 id.58 Id. at 602.
59 Id. at 601-02.60 Id. at 601.
61 Id. at 602.
62 id.
63 id.
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tutional rights at the school house gate" is practically obso-
lete in today's schools.64
The Sixth Circuit had to decide if school officials
merited qualified immunity.65  First, the court examined
whether the searches violated the students' Fourth
Amendment rights under the reasonableness standard.66
The Sixth Circuit evaluated whether the search was "justi-
fied at its inception" and "reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances." 67 The search was "justified at inception,"
but the search's scope was unconstitutional.68 The search
occurred in a compulsory gym class, and the students, un-
like athletes, did not choose "to be regulated more closely
than the general student population." 69 As such, they me-
rited a greater expectation of privacy than student athletes
did.70 The search was highly intrusive because the students
disrobed, and the girls' searches, unlike the boys' searches,
occurred with other students present.7 1 Finally, the search
attempted to locate missing money, which courts have
considered to serve "a less weighty governmental interest
than a search undertaken for items that pose a threat to the
64 Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(mem.) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).65 Beard, 402 F.3d at 603.
66 Id.; accord Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 901
6th Cir. 2004).
7 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (internal citation
omitted).68 Beard 402 F.3d at 604-06.
69 Id. at 605.
70 See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662, 664-65
(1995) (holding that suspicion-less drug searches are constitutional
when performed on student athletes).
71 Compare Beard, 402 F.3d at 606 with Reynolds v. City of Anchor-
age, 379 F.3d 358, 365 (6th Cir. 2004) (demonstrating that a strip
search's intrusive nature can be minimized by conducting them in
private rooms with a minimal number of staff).
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health or safety of students, such as drugs or weapons. 72
These factors, along with no individualized suspicion or
consent, caused the search's scope to be unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment. 
73
Because a constitutional violation occurred, the
Sixth Circuit had to determine if the law was clearly estab-
lished "in light of the specific context of the case, not as a
broad general proposition." 74 In search of guidance, the
Sixth Circuit examined Supreme Court cases, cases in the
Sixth Circuit, and cases in other circuits. 75 The Sixth Cir-
cuit noted that Vernonia76 and T.L.O. 77 articulated basic
search principles. 78 These cases, however, offered school
officials no guidance about what would constitute notice
"that the searches ... were unreasonable" because the Su-
preme Court's test for reasonableness did not "explain how
the factors should be applied" when school officials en-
countered these situations.79 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit
noted, "the reasonableness standard... has left courts later
confronted with the issue either reluctant or unable to de-
fine what type of official conduct would be subject to a...
cause of action."'
80
The Sixth Circuit cases do not clarify whether the
law surrounding strip searches was clearly established. The
court granted qualified immunity in two cases because of
individualized suspicion of certain students, but in another
72 Beard, 402 F.3d at 605; accord Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661; Oliver ex
rel. Hines v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1218 (N.D. id. 1995)
tmem.).
3 Beard, 402 F.3d at 606.
74 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
7' Beard, 402 F.3d at 606-07; see McBride v. Village of Michiana, 100
F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir. 1996).
76 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
77 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
78 Beard, 402 F.3d at 607 (internal citations omitted).79 id.
80 1d. (quoting Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881,
886 (6th Cir. 1991)).
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case, the court denied qualified immunity because a rule or
law violation may not have occurred. 81 Thus, the Sixth
Circuit cases yielded no clear stance on strip searches for
school officials.
82
Other circuits have established a clear stance on
strip searches, but the Sixth Circuit believes that these cases
do not clearly establish "the unlawfulness of the defen-
dants' actions in this case." 83 The Sixth Circuit only uses
opinions from other circuits if they "point unmistakably to
the unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of and
[are] so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct authority
as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that
his conduct, if challenged on constitutional grounds, would
be found wanting." 84 Because these cases do not meet this
standard, the Sixth Circuit held that the law was not clearly
established and granted the school officials qualified im-
munity.8
5
V. Ramifications of Beard on Future School
Searches and Students' Rights
Beard shows how the reasonableness standard and
qualified immunity has eroded students' rights and granted
school officials enormous leeway in their searches. Initial-
ly, students' Fourth Amendment rights varied from school
to school, but after T.L.O., a reasonableness standard go-
verned school searches. 86 The courts have broadened this
standard. Under the reasonableness standard, school offi-
cials do not necessarily need individualized suspicion, but
81 See Williams, 936 F.2d at 889; Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 984
(6th Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted). But see Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch.,
635 F. Supp. 454,458 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (mem.).
82 Beard, 402 F.3d at 608.
83 Id.
84 Id. (quoting Williams, 936 F.2d at 885) (alteration in original).85 Id.
86 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
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individualized suspicion could ensure that school officials
will be entitled qualified immunity. 87 Thanks to the confu-
sion, teachers do not know which searches are constitution-
al and perform questionable searches as a result. Justice
Brennan's prediction in T.L.O. that the reasonableness
standard would cause confusion has come true. 
88
Beard proves that courts need to define the law sur-
rounding school searches more clearly. Otherwise, teach-
ers can act with impunity because either they do not know
the law, or they know that the confusion in the law will
protect them. Because the law in various circuits is in a
state of disarray, students lack protection within school
walls. The added exceptions and qualifications to the rea-
sonableness standard do not aid teachers in understanding
the law; they only create more confusion. Without a clear-
ly established standard for school searches, teachers almost
always merit qualified immunity, and no check or balance
exists to prevent them from trampling on students' rights.
Thus, students' Fourth Amendment rights practically do not
exist because the courts consider the searches reasonable or
qualified immunity exists. Beard is a distress signal to the
courts to reach a consensus on what is and is not constitu-
tional in school searches.
Beard has far-reaching future implications. First,
Beard demonstrates that teachers can conduct unreasonable
and unconstitutional searches with little fear of liability.
The decision allows teachers to see how far they can tread
on students' rights because liability will not result thanks to
qualified immunity. Second, if schools continue to conduct
strip searches, the courts may eventually consider them
reasonable in all situations. For example, the courts may
87 See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1995);
see also Williams, 936 F.2d at 889 (stating that the principal's reasona-
ble suspicion that students were concealing drugs provided him with
qualified immunity for his search).
8 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 365. (Brennan, J. concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
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find a school's actions reasonable enough to allow strip
searches in group situations without individualized suspi-
cion. Third, Beard demonstrates that a clearly defined
standard on student searches must exist to prevent students
from "shed[ding] their rights at the school house gate." 89 If
students have no rights in school searches, then the trend
will spread from schools into society at large.
Fourth, this decision demonstrates that schools have
become more concerned with crime prevention and safety
than educating students. Teachers conduct unconstitutional
searches under the guise of protecting students. The courts
deem these searches unconstitutional, but the teachers still
receive qualified immunity for their actions because the
courts believe that today's schools are unsafe. If teachers
must evaluate reasonableness, conduct a search, and prove
that the law was not clearly established, when do they edu-
cate students? Teachers spend more time policing students
and defending their actions than educating students. With-
out education, our government, judicial system, and society
in general will suffer from ignorance.
VI. Conclusion
In conclusion, Beard demonstrates how students'
Fourth Amendment rights and school searches have come
full circle. Even with the reasonableness standard, a state
of confusion still exists, and qualified immunity protects
teachers from liability. Students receive no benefits from
the reasonableness standard. The courts must reach a con-
sensus on the law in this area, or students will continue to
endure unreasonable searches. If the law continues in its
state of disarray, then students may have no Fourth
Amendment rights in schools because the courts continue
89 Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(mem.) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Crnmy. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
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to add exceptions. The courts must set a clear standard on
school searches so that teachers and students can return to
the important tasks of teaching and learning.
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NOTE
A VICTORY IN DEFEAT:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF RUMSFELD V. FAIR ON
"DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL"
Jill Shotzberger
I. Introduction
On March 6, 2006, the United States Supreme Court
decided Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights.' In this decision, drafted by Chief Justice John
Roberts, the Court addressed the constitutionality of Con-
gress (1) requiring universities to provide military recrui-
ters with the same access to law school career services
offices that the school would grant to other prospective
employers and (2) withholding federal funding for the en-
tire university if the law school failed to grant this access. 2
The Supreme Court held that these requirements did not
violate the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech
and freedom of association.3 Although this case, which
pitted thirty-six prestigious law schools against the Secre-
tary of Defense, failed in its constitutional challenge, it
succeeded in bringing attention to a larger public policy
concern: the United States government's continued im-
plementation of the controversial policy of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell."
1 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst. Rights, Inc., No. 04-1152,
slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter FAIR].2 Id. at 6.
3 Id. at 20.
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II. The Solomon Amendment
In 1993, Congress enacted "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
(DADT), a policy that banned openly gay men, lesbians,
and bisexuals from serving in the military.4 This provision
codified a fifty-year-old practice that allowed any statement
by a soldier about his or her sexual orientation to anyone at
any time to be reasonable grounds for dismissal from ser-
vice. 5 Due to the implementation of the DADT policy, law
schools began to marginalize or even disallow military
recruiters on campus. 6 The Association of American Law
Schools (AALS) requires its member schools to adopt a
nondiscrimination policy that includes sexual orientation.
This policy limits the availability of a school's facilities
and resources to those employers that comply with the
AALS statement on equal opportunity employment. 7 Due
to DADT, military recruiters were unable to meet the re-
quirements of AALS's nondiscrimination policy, and they
were denied access or were granted limited recruiting
access by AALS schools.
8
In response to the restricted access for military re-
cruiters, Congress adopted the Solomon Amendment in
1996 as a part of the National Defense Authorization Act. 9
4 10 U.S.C.A. § 654 (1993).
5 E.g. NALP, Solomon Amendment Information,
www.nalp.org/content/index.php?pid=8 1&printer-friendly-true (last
visited June 4, 2006) [hereinafter NALP].6id.
7 E.g. Memorandum from Carl Monk, Association of American Law
Schools, Executive Committee Policy Regarding "Solomon Amend-
ment" (Jan. 24, 2000), www.aals.org/deansmemos/00-2.html (last
visited June 6, 2006).
8 See Remarks at the Georgetown Federalist Society Symposium:
Solomon Amendment: Can Congress Condition Benefits to Colleges
and Universities on Their Willingness to Allow Military Recruiters on
Campus 9 (Oct. 20, 2005) (transcript available at Georgetown Law
Center) [hereinafter Georgetown Symposium].
9 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (1999).
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This amendment prohibited the allocation of funds from the
Department of Defense to colleges or universities that
barred ROTC and military recruiters from access to campus
or career services. 10 In 1999, the Solomon Amendment
was modified in the Omnibus Appropriations Act to with-
hold funds from the Departments of Defense, Labor, Health
and Human Services, and Education.ll When the Solomon
Amendment was enacted, if a department of a university
(i.e. the law school) denied access to a military recruiter,
federal funding would be terminated for that department.
The 1999 modification expanded these sanctions by permit-
ting all federal funding to an entire university to be with-
drawn if military recruiters were denied access to a single
department within the institution.12 Congress approved a
final expansion of the Solomon Amendment in 2004 to
clarify and strengthen the policy by stating that military
recruiters must have the same access as other employers
and by increasing the potential penalty for noncompliance
by adding to the list of federal agencies that could deny
funding to the offending schools. 13
Il. Rumsfeld v. FAIR
After the 2004 revision of the Solomon Amend-
ment, thirty-six law schools, along with other affiliated
groups and individual plaintiffs, united to challenge the
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment through a
new organization entitled the Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights (FAIR). 14 FAIR asserted that the So-
lo Id.
I See NALP, supra note 5.
12 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (2006).
13id.
14 Georgetown Symposium, supra note 8 at 10-11; see Brief for the
ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, Rumsfeld
v. FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Brief of
ACL U].
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lomon Amendment violated the First Amendment rights of
free expressive association and free speech through com-
pelled speech and viewpoint discrimination. 1
5
The U.S. District Court in New Jersey held that
there was no violation of free speech, because the law
schools had adequate opportunity to express their own
opposition to the military policy of DADT while still pro-
tecting the government's interest in allowing military re-
cruiters on campus.16 Additionally, the court determined
that requiring military recruiters on campus comported with
the standard set in United States v. O'Brien. 7  0 'Brien
determined that a compelling government interest in main-
taining the availability of draft cards outweighs one's right
to noncommunicative conduct.18 With regard to the Solo-
mon Amendment, this precedent allows the government
"[to] regulate conduct even if such regulation entails an
incidental limitation on speech." 19 Furthermore, the district
court held that the expressive conduct of allowing military
recruiters on campus was merely secondary to the primary
economic purpose of supporting the armed forces. 20 Ac-
cording to the district court, the compelling government
interest in raising an army balanced against the law
schools' ability to reject the recruiters, albeit at the cost of
losing their funding, failed to infringe on the constitutional
rights of free speech and free association. 21
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disa-
greed, determining that it was unconstitutional to force a
law school to choose between First Amendment rights and
15 Brief ofACLU, supra note 14 at 5; FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp.
2d 269, 274-75 (D.N.J. 2003).
16See FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 3.
17 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d 296 at 314.18 See U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-382 (1968) (holding that
burning a draft card is noncormmnicative conduct).
'9 FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375).
20 Id. at 308.
21Id at 312.
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funding under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 2 2
The Court also held that the O'Brien analysis did not apply
because the Solomon Amendment explicitly restricted
expressive conduct, making the amendment unconstitution-
al on alternate grounds. 23  The Court reversed and re-
manded the decision to the lower court to issue a
preliminary injunction against application of the Solomon
Amendment.24 The Supreme Court granted Certiorari.25
IV. Statutory v. Constitutional Argument
The first struggle that came to fruition for FAIR and
the parties who opposed the Solomon Amendment con-
cerned their methodology in approaching the Court. Har-
vard Law professors, along with many of their colleagues,
filed amicus briefs arguing for a statutory, rather than a
constitutional, approach to eliminating the Solomon
Amendment. This challenged the language in the statute
which indicated that recruiters be granted access "at least
equal in quality and scope to the access. .. that is provided
to any other employer." 26 Under this language, the profes-
sors argued that AALS members and other schools that
prohibit military recruiters are doing so in compliance with
the Solomon Amendment, because they are treating the
military the same way that they would treat other employ-
ers who failed to adhere to the non-discrimination policy. 27
Thus, the schools would not be specifically targeting the
military, but rather, all parties who discriminate. This ar-
" FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 246 (3rd Cir. 2004).231 d. at 243-44.
Id. at 246.
Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 544 U.S. 1017 (2005).
26 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(B)(1) (2006).
27 Daniel J. Hemel, Future of Campus Military Recruiting Hangs in theBalance at High Court, THE HARVARD CRIMSON, Dec. 4, 2005,
www.thecrimson.corn/article.aspx?ref-=510278 (last visited June 8,
2006).
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gument presents the premise that schools are complying
with the Solomon Amendment as written, but Congress is
still withholding funds until special, rather than equal,
treatment is given to military recruiters.
28
The law schools attempted to sidestep the constitutional
issue by presenting the argument that they could implement
their nondiscrimination policies while giving separate, yet
equal access to military recruiters. Had FAIR only taken a
statutory approach and won, it is conceivable that Congress
might have immediately amended the statute to provide for
special treatment of military recruiters, thereby re-
launching the issue into a constitutional debate.29
Although not included in FAIR's brief, the Court
did address this issue in its opinion. The Court determined
that the intent of Congress in enacting the Solomon
Amendment was not in the content of the Amendment, but
rather, the result.30 Therefore, because access is the in-
tended result, when other employers have greater access
than the military, the schools are in violation of the
amendment. The Supreme Court interpreted the statute to
imply that it is not sufficient to treat the military the same
way as other employers who violate the nondiscrimination
policy.31 The military must be granted the "same access as
those who comply with the policy" in order to act in accor-
dance with the intention of Congress.
32
V. Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
The next element of this debate addressed by the
Supreme Court was whether Congress placed an unconsti-
28 Georgetown Symposium, supra note 8 at 45.
29 Hemel, supra note 27.
30 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 7 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2006).
31Id. at 8.
32 id.
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tutional condition on its allocation of funding. 33 In Grove
City College v. Bell, the Court indicated that funding could
be conditioned because universities are not obligated to
accept that funding. 34 This is seen most often, as it was in
Grove City, in Title IX gender discrimination cases. De-
spite Congress' ability to condition funding, Speiser v.
Randall determined that it is unconstitutional for Congress
to condition funding unless Congress would be able to
directly mandate that action.35 In this case, if Congress had
the power to directly order that recruiters be permitted on
university campuses, then they could condition the funding.
This gives the Spending Clause of the Constitution, which
determines how Congress may allocate funds, equal
breadth with those powers that can be directly required by
Congress. United States v. American Library Associations
determined that funding cannot be limited if the burden
placed on the accepting group infringes on constitutional
rights. 36  FAIR argued that the Solomon Amendment
placed an unjust burden on speech. The Court disagreed.
The Court determined that it would be constitution-
al for Congress to directly mandate that military recruiters
be allowed on campus. This mandate is permitted because
the government interest in supporting the military should be
given deference. 37 FAIR's First Amendment challenges are
outweighed by the compelling government interest in sus-
taining national defense. The Court has used and indicates
it will continue to use the argument of a compelling gov-
ernment interest in national defense in challenges against
33 See id. at 9; see generally Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555(1984).
4 See, e.g., Grove City College, 465 U.S. 555 at 575-76.
35 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958); see also George-
town Symposium, supra note 8 at 25-26.
36 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210
(2003).
31 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 8 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2006).
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the military under Title IX or Title VI. 38 By asserting this
position, the Court shows its commitment to uphold and
give deference to military policies despite the possible
discriminatory effect on gender, race, or sexuality. 39
Therefore, it is inconsequential whether the condition is
attached to funding, because the Court validates the condi-
tion as a compelling government interest. 40 If a condition
can be directly mandated, then it can be attached to funding
through the Spending Clause.4'
VI. Speech
The next constitutional question addressed by the
Court was whether the Solomon Amendment violates the
First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district
court determined that "the inclusion of an unwanted period-
ic visitor did not significantly affect the law schools' ability
to express their particular message or viewpoint. '42 The
Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that speech was in-
volved in promoting the recruiters and that this speech
forced colleges to host the military's message, as well as
compelled the schools to sponsor the recruiters through
their resources. 43 The Supreme Court rejected this position.
According to the Court's decision in Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Assn., citizens may challenge compelled private
speech but have no First Amendment right not to fund
government speech.44  Therefore, there is "no First
Amendment right not to fund government speech as the
representatives of the United States military. ' ' 4  Any
38 id.
39 See Georgetown Symposium, supra note 8 at 27.
40 See id. at 26.
41 FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 3.
42 id.
431d. at 10.
44 Johanns. v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n., 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
45 id.
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speech expounded by the recruiters is considered govern-
ment speech. In addition, the Supreme Court held that the
assistance provided to the military recruiters was minimal
and not of a monetary nature; therefore, the subsidy issue
was not pertinent to the outcome of this case. 46
The next speech issue under consideration by the
Court was compelled government speech. The Court held
that cases such as West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard do not govern Rumsfeld
because, despite the fact that there are elements of speech
in disseminating notice of the recruiters' presence on cam-
pus, the speech used to comply with the Solomon Amend-
ment does not include a required government pledge or
specific content that the school must endorse. 47 Requiring
schools to include recruiters on event schedules or em-
ployment fair flyers does not approach the type of speech
protected by Wooley or Barnette.
Like compelled speech, the type of speech required
by the Solomon Amendment fails to meet the standard set
forth in cases dealing with hosting or accommodating
another group's message. To meet the burden of these
cases, the Solomon Amendment would have to inhibit the
school's own message and force the college or university to
accommodate the military's message instead of their own,
or the conduct would have to be of such an expressive
nature that the message of the school would be compro-
mised by the inclusion of the recruiters. 48 The Court held
46FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 11 n.4.47 Id. at 11-12. See generally W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943) (holding that a state law requiring school children to recite
the Pledge of Allegiance and salute the flag was unconstitutional); see
generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding it was
unconstitutional for New Hampshire to require that drivers display
"Live Free or Die" on their license plate).
48 FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 15. See generally Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
(holding that the public accommodation law as applied to a private
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that allowing recruiters on campus is not inherently expres-
sive, because assisting a student in obtaining employment
is not expressive. 49 Furthermore, the message of the school
is not suppressed through this statute. Colleges and univer-
sities are free to voice their opposition to DADT or any
other military policy. The colleges may post signs where
the recruiters are located or speak out on the issue without
ramifications under the Solomon Amendment. The Court
rejected the argument that simply by having the recruiters
on campus, the school would be viewed as endorsing the
military's policies. 50 As the Court decided in Board of
Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,
high school students are capable of distinguishing between
speech that a school sponsors and speech that a school
permits; Chief Justice Roberts contended, "Surely students
have not lost that ability by the time they get to law
school. ' 51 Since colleges and universities are still free to
express their views on military policies and the message of
the school is in no way compromised by the Solomon
Amendment, the Court determined that there is no in-
fringement on speech.
VII. Expressive Conduct
Conduct can be recognized as symbolic speech
when its inherently expressive nature merits First Amend-
ment protection.5 2 The Court determined that the conduct
governed by the Solomon Amendment is not inherently
parade can alter the expressive nature of the conduct and violates the
First Amendment protection of choosing one's own message); see
generally Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(holding that you cannot interfere with a speaker's intended message).
41 FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 15.
50 d. at 10.
51 FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 15. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside
Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
52 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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expressive. 53 Since the message that universities are send-
ing when they exclude military recruiters is unclear without
the accompanying speech, the conduct alone is not expres-
sive.54 The Court held that since explanatory speech is
needed to accompany the conduct, O 'Brien does not govern
the issue.55 Moreover, a minor burden on speech is per-
missible under O'Brien if the government regulation at
issue promotes a substantial government interest that would
be more difficult to attain without the existing policy.
56
Raising and supporting a military is a substantial govern-
ment interest, and the effectiveness of this action is altered
when schools hinder the military's ability to recruit. Al-
though alternative methods for recruiting can be imple-
mented, the Supreme Court has deemed this the
responsibility of Congress rather than of the courts.5 7 Since
the Solomon Amendment does assist in the effectiveness of
military recruiting and is the chosen method of Congress,
the policy will withstand the challenge under O'Brien and
does not constitute a violation of the First Amendment right
to freedom of speech.58
VIII. Freedom of Association
The First Amendment goes beyond the right of
speech, in that it also protects the freedom of association.
One important recent case on the freedom of expressive
association is Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale.59 In Dale, the
53 FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 16.
54Id. at 16-17.
55 id.
56 See id.
57 Id. at 18.
58 d.
59 See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655-59 (2000)
(holding that the Boy Scouts were an expressive association in which
the forced inclusion of a homosexual would significantly affect their
141
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government of New Jersey was forcing the organization to
"accept members it did not desire." 60 Unlike Dale, under
the Solomon Amendment, schools are not compelled to
associate with military recruiters in this fashion; the schools
are simply required to interact with the recruiters for a
limited time and purpose, which fails to inhibit the school's
message. 61 There is neither forced inclusion nor an effect
on the schools' right to expressive association, because
they are still free to convey their disapproval of the mili-
tary's message. Likewise, according to the Court, there is
no effect on the attractiveness of membership in the univer-
sity simply because of the presence of military recruiters. 
62
Through this analysis, the Court held that there was
no infringement on the First Amendment protections of
freedom of speech, expressive conduct, or association.
There was also no violation of the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions. Therefore, the Solomon Amendment is
constitutional and should continue to be upheld.
IX. Why FAIR Lost the Battle
FAIR and numerous other organizations and legal
scholars disagree with the Supreme Court's decision in
Rumsfeld. The first point of contention is how the Court
treated speech. For FAIR, et al. the definition of speech
may have been more narrowly construed than was ex-
pected. Email and written notices, as well as providing the
recruiters with space and access to students, were actions
too broad to be considered as speech by the Court. Re-
nowned constitutional scholar, Erwin Chemerinsky, who
personally filed his own amicus brief, wrote, "Never before
expression. The states interest did not justify the intrusion; therefore, it
violated the organization's First Amendment rights).
"°FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op at 19.61 Id.
62 Id. at 20.
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has the Supreme Court held that the government can com-
pel speech as long as the speaker can disavow the com-
pelled message later." 63 He cited Hurley v. Irish- American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. as illu-
strating that compelled speech was not excused only be-
cause the parade organizers could have expressed their
disapproval of the group. 64 By limiting what is considered
protected speech, the Court diminished the effectiveness of
the FAIR supporters' contentions.
Not only was the argument about the form of
speech curtailed, but other scholars contend that the Court
undervalued the significance of the non-discrimination
message. Non-discrimination, to the extent it is valued by
these universities, is a momentous expression. By denying
recognition of this policy as speech, the Court not only
affected challenges to the Solomon Amendment but many
fear their decision spoke to the new Roberts Court's ap-
proach to equality and discrimination issues. 65
In addition to altering what was previously ac-
knowledged as speech, this Court also took a new approach
to the nature of freedom of association. For the first time,
freedom of association was limited to those groups with
membership. 66 The Court had previously ruled, "the gov-
ernment cannot compel association in a manner that is
inconsistent with a group's expressive message. 67 Appli-
cation of the Solomon Amendment to universities forces
association by compelling interaction with military recrui-
ters. It may have been unforeseen by FAIR and its suppor-
ters that "interaction" would be construed differently than
63 Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment and Military Recruiting,
TRIAL, May 2006, at 79.
64 Id.
65 See David L. Hudson, Law Schools Told to Allow Military Recrui-
ters, ABA JOURNAL E-REPORT, Mar. 10, 2006.66Chemerinsky, supra note 63.
67 I.; see Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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"association' thereby negating their freedom of association
claims.
A final misjudgment by FAIR may have been their
choice of challenging the Solomon Amendment, rather than
going to the root of the problem. DADT is bad public
policy and is the origin of the challenges to the Solomon
Amendment. Although DADT conflicts with the schools'
non-discrimination policies, many scholars, even those who
vehemently oppose DADT, thought the First Amendment
contentions against the Solomon Amendment were obscure
at best. With a growing trend on the Court towards strict
textualism, supporters acknowledged that it would be diffi-
cult to mold the law schools' concerns into a First Amend-
ment case. 68 On the surface, the statutory challenges were
more substantiated than the constitutional claims, despite
their easy correction by Congress through a minor change
in the language. However, the Court struck these chal-
lenges down as well. Notwithstanding, their overwhelming
defeat in this case, FAIR and their supporters still have
other fronts on which they can voice their opposition to the
Solomon Amendment and DADT.
X. Why Rumsfeld v. FAIR May Be a Turning Point
in a Greater War
The Solomon Amendment is only a symptom of a
greater quandary. If DADT were repealed, law schools
would not need to exclude the military, because there
would be no conflict with the Solomon Amendment.
Rumsfeld v. FAIR could act as a symbolic expression of a
growing majority who oppose the military's discriminatory
policies. Bringing attention to challenges like Rumsfeld
promotes messages of equality and the repeal of DADT.
69
68 Georgetown Symposium, supra note 8.
69 See SolomonResponse.org Home Page, www.SolomonResponse.org
(last visited June 10, 2006).
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In upholding the Solomon Amendment, the Court endorses
a policy that forces schools to relent on their messages of
non-discrimination. The outcome of Rumsfeld has inspired
others to further scrutinize DADT, the policy on which the
decision was grounded. 70 Even with unanimous defeat in
Rumsfeld, DADT and the Solomon Amendment have been
thrust into the public forum bringing attention to what
many Americans would consider unfair and discriminatory
policies. Once the issue reaches the forefront, new meas-
ures can be advanced and considered in defining a viable
strategy to overturn these policies.
Given that the Solomon Amendment and DADT are
statutory, there are two methods to defeat them. The first is
for the courts to deem them unconstitutional. The second is
for Congress to repeal them. 71 Currently, two challenges to
DADT await litigation that could eliminate the policy.
72
Chemerinsky contends that Rumsfeld may have only a
narrow impact as precedent or as a guide to policy because
the longstanding tradition of deference to the military by
the Supreme Court. This continuing deference, coupled
with decisions like Dale and Hurley, which are discrimina-
tory to the gay and lesbian community, may limit the
Court's application of this case as future precedent. 73
The second means of eliminating DADT, through
Congressional repeal, is also gaining momentum. As more
attention is brought to the millions of dollars spent to oust
more than 10,000 homosexuals from the military, some
members of Congress are taking action.74 Representative
70 Posting of Sharon Alexander, Deputy Director of Policy, Service-
members Legal Defense Network, to American Constitution Society
Blog, www.acsblog.org/guest-bloggers-2672-guest-blogger-losing-the-
battle-but-winning-the-war.html (Mar. 9, 2006, 2:15 PM EST) [herei-
nafter Alexander].71id.
72 id.
73 Chemerinsky, supra note 63.74 Alexander, supra note 70.
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Marty Meehan of Massachusetts introduced the Military
Readiness Enhancement Act, which would repeal DADT.75
The bill, which currently has 114 co-sponsors in the House,
is awaiting further discussion in the Military Personnel
76Subcommittee. Interested parties are also working on
finding bipartisan co-sponsors in the Senate to introduce
similar legislation. 77 As support grows in Congress, in-
creased attention will be brought to the dangers of discri-
minatory policies and their effects outside the military in
places like universities.
XI. Conclusion
Through the above-mentioned legislative and legal
methods, the cause championed by FAIR and its supporters
has not been lost; continued challenges to DADT are un-
derway. As the attack on discriminatory public policies
continues on multiple fronts, Rumsfeld v. FAIR may prove
not to be a setback, but a stepping stone to the abolition of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell."
75 See Press Release, Representative Marty Meehan, Meehan Introduc-
es Legislation to Repeal Don't Ask, Don't Tell (Mar. 2, 2005),
www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ma5_meehan/NR050302DADT.html
(last visited June 8, 2006).76 See HR 1059, 109th Cong. (2005).
77Alexander, supra note 70.
146
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol4/iss1/1
4:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 147
147
et al.: Vol 4 No 1
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
